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Abstract

This paper aims to contribute to the new wave of democracy measurement that we have experienced during the last years. We show that the new democracy measurement tools represent major steps forwards in aligning methodology to theory and practice. Nevertheless, we argue that in respect to the fundamental dimension of inclusion there is still a gap between measurement tools and theoretical discourse/practical struggles. We proceed as follows: First, we show that the “problem of inclusion” (Dahl) is now once again at the forefront of both political struggles and normative democratic theory. Second, we show how and why it was side-lined in almost all important democracy indices in the 20th century and that it is only taken up on the margins of the two most recent and sophisticated democracy measurement tools. Third, we sketch three pathways to close the gap between the practical struggles of democratization and normative theories of democracy on the one hand and democracy measurement on the other hand. Since we believe that the inclusion of immigrants is currently the most important frontier of democratic inclusion and because in normative democratic theory there exists an overwhelming consensus that immigrants have to be included into the demoi of nation-states, we focus on this group; yet there are further political struggles and normative debates to expand the boundary of the demos (e.g. towards non-adults and towards all affected), which should not be ignored either.

Keywords: Democracy measurement, quality of democracy, varieties of democracy, democratic theory, concept formation, inclusion, suffrage, boundary of the demos, immigration

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2 http://www.democracybarometer.org/about_en.html (February 11, 2015)
1. Introduction and overview

In the last few years, we have seen the emergence of new and sophisticated quantitative tools for measuring the degree of democratization or the quality of democracies, and for comparing divergent types of democracies. Exemplary for this development are the Democracy Barometer (DemBar)\(^2\), a joint project of the Berlin Social Science Centre (WZB) and the University of Zurich, and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project\(^3\), a broad transatlantic endeavor lead by M. Coppedge, S. Lindberg, G. Gerring and J. Teorell. Whereas the former project represents the most ambitious example of what can be called the *quality turn* in democracy measurement, the latter embodies the recognition of existing variety not only in democratic practice but also in democratic theory. These and similar projects\(^4\) represent important steps forward in providing adequate tools for comparing and assessing political regimes since they take into account recent developments in both democratic theory and methodologies of concept formation.

Nevertheless, all these projects side-line *inclusion* as a fundamental dimension of democracy,

- despite the fact that the dimension of inclusion played a major role in Robert Dahl’s *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (1971), a publication that served as key point of reference for virtually all approaches to measure democratization or the level/quality of democracy during the 20\(^{th}\) century (Lauth 2004: 237-8);
- despite its renewed practical relevance in a time, in which globalization lifts the cleavage between those who value openness and diversity on the one hand, and those who defend closeness and homogeneity on the other hand, up to a core structural conflict in European democracies (Kriesi et al. 2006), and when “immigration has changed US politics in significant ways” (Jones-Correa and de Graauw 2013: 210);
- despite the fact that the “boundary problem” of democracy (Whelan 1983; MacDonald 2003) and the emergence of Post-Westphalian “spaces of citizenship” (Schlenker and Blatter 2014) have become hot topics in normative democratic theory, taking into account not only the flows of people across the territorial boundaries of nation-states, but also the

\(^2\) [http://www.democracybarometer.org/about_en.html](http://www.democracybarometer.org/about_en.html) (February 11, 2015)
\(^3\) [https://v-dem.net/DemoComp/en/](https://v-dem.net/DemoComp/en/) (February 11, 2015)
\(^4\) Bühlmann et al. (2012: 531) and Munck (2014) provide overviews.
growing flows of information, capital, goods and “bads” (e.g. emissions and crime) and the resulting (inter-)dependencies\(^5\) between political decision-making processes of nation-states and of political decision-making beneath and beyond the nation-state; and

- despite the fact that we have seen a proliferation of indices for naturalization and/or integration policies (for an overview see Helbling 2013). There seems to be surprisingly little exchange between those who develop quantitative tools for measuring, evaluating and comparing democracies and those who do the same for citizenship regimes – although obviously there exists a significant overlap between the two concepts.

With our contribution we want to make the case for taking the fundamental dimension of inclusion more adequately into account when measuring, comparing and evaluating democracies. We start by showing that in the last 50 years democracy measurement tools have been developed and adapted in accordance with practical challenges or tasks and that these adjustments mirror innovations in democratic theory. The two most recent democracy measurement tools reflect this kind of adaptation very well – with the exception of inclusion! In respect to this fundamental dimension of democracy, we are witnessing, as we subsequently show, a growing gap between the renewed practical relevance and normative demands on the one hand and the ongoing marginalization in recent measurement tools on the other hand.

In contrast to earlier democracy indices, inclusion is not totally ignored anymore, but the Democracy Barometer and the Varieties of Democracy projects primarily trace the inclusion/exclusion of groups which have been at the center of normative debates during the 20\(^{th}\) century (e.g. women) – they side-line those groups on which the most recent normative debates in democratic theory have focused: migrants, non-adults and affected externals. At least the measurement of the inclusion of immigrants (non-citizen residents) should no longer be ignored in democracy indices, because there already is a consensus among most normative theorists of democracy that democratic states have to include immigrants into the demos, although the specific conditions may still be disputed.

In the last part of the paper we scrutinize three different pathways for closing the gap between democracy measurement and democratic theory/practice. To present such

\(^5\) The brackets indicate that the relationships that create and are created by cross-border flows and exchanges are often not characterized by symmetric interdependencies but asymmetric dependencies.
different pathways takes due account of the often neglected fact that democracy indices serve different purposes, and that determining how to improve existing democracy measurement tools or how to develop new indices thus depends on primary purpose of these indices.

a. Index builders who aim to describe the long-term processes of democratization and who want to use the resulting index for analyzing the causes and consequences of democratization should focus on electoral inclusiveness, both because voting rights are essential for democracies and due to relatively high data availability/reliability in this area. Furthermore, the development of the past 200 years should be measured against a standard that represents the current state of the art in the normative discourse: An inclusive democracy provides all adult residents (independent of nationality) with voting rights. Finally, in order to capture current and future expansions of the demos, we should start to measure the electoral inclusion of non-adults and non-residents.

b. An index designed to map the various ways in which democracies can be inclusive should go beyond electoral inclusion and complement the measurement of voting rights with indicators that represent other (e.g. liberal, participatory, deliberative) understandings of inclusion.

c. An index aiming to assess the quality of democracies must explicitly define normative standards of democratic inclusiveness and justify those with reference to normative theories of democracy. We will briefly scrutinize our corresponding project entitled the immigrant inclusion index (IMIX).

2. Starting points and turns in the development of democracy indices: aligning measurement to reality and theory

Robert Dahl’s work is widely recognized as a transmission belt between normative democratic theory and the empirical study of democratization (Lauth 2004: 22; Munck 2009: 17). With his work Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (1971) he laid the groundwork for most democracy measurement tools that emerged until the end of the 20th century. The most fundamental element of this work is that Dahl distinguishes two dimensions of democratization: Opposition, public contestation, political competition or
liberalization on the one hand and inclusiveness or participation on the other hand (he uses these terms interchangeably, Dahl 1971: 4-7).

Dahl and his followers developed the democracy measurement tools in the context of waves of democratization (overviews over democracy indices are provided by Lauth 2004: 227-317, 388-410; Goertz 2006: 112-113, Munck 2009: 14). Their main goal was to investigate the conditions which favor or impede the transformation from non-democratic to democratic regimes (Dahl 1971: 1). Therefore, measuring the degree by which existing political systems resemble the ideal of democracy\(^6\) represents only a first step for this explanatory goal.

In other words, democracy became to be conceptualized and measured as the dependent variable for an endeavor that primarily aimed to reveal the conditions and causes for successful transformations from authoritarian to democratic regimes. This goal is most obvious in the index that became to be used primarily by social scientists because of its long historical record: the Polity Index (initiated by Gurr 1974) captures most countries of the world since 1800 and includes not only an “institutionalized democracy” index but also an “institutionalized autocracy” index, which are then integrated into the combined polity score (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).

What the Polity Index shares with most other important indices (e.g. Coppedge and Reinicke 1990; Alvarez et al. 1996), but also with indices which were developed in order to serve policy assessment or evaluative purposes – like the Freedom House Index\(^7\) or the Economist Democracy Index\(^8\) – is the fact that a liberal understanding of democracy became absolutely predominant. This can be seen as a departure from Dahl’s approach, yet Dahl himself stimulated this development. Arguably, the two dimensions that Dahl (1971) distinguished – liberalization/contestation and inclusion/participation – resemble the two most important traditions in democratic theory: liberalism and republicanism (Held 2006).

\(^6\) Dahl preferred to call highly inclusive and liberalized systems “polyarchies”, reserving the term democracy to systems which are “completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens”, a state of affairs that “may involve more dimensions than [inclusion and liberalization]”, and indicated later on that for him, social rights and a certain level of equality resembled such a third necessary dimension for fully democratic regimes (see Dahl 1971: 2, 8, 10-1).


In *Polyarchy*, he did not refer to these traditions, but the affinities are very obvious. The examples that Dahl provided for illustrating the two dimensions of democratization set the stage for his followers to focus on the liberal dimension. Dahl described Britain and Switzerland as highly developed systems of public contestation which were highly exclusive — until the end of the 19th century (the former country) and at the time of writing (the latter country) —, but argued that “[p]robably few people would challenge the view that the Swiss regime is highly democratic [...although] the feminine half of the Swiss population is still excluded from national elections” (Dahl 1971: 5). As an example for a system that is highly inclusive, but not liberalized, he pointed to the USSR.

Given this starting point, the political contexts of the last quarter of the 20th century (until the end of the 1980s the Cold War between East and West and then the collapse of the communist regimes) and the dominance of liberalism in political philosophy (with John Rawls as an almost unavoidable point of reference for political philosophers) and in normative as well as in empirical theories of democracy (Held 2006; Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009), it does not come as a surprise that the most recognized indices have focused (almost) exclusively on the liberalization/contestation dimension (Coppedge 2012: 28).

Of course, in political practice and normative theory, we can detect dissenters within the field of democracy measurement. Vanhanen (1990), Arat (1991), and Hadenius (1992) still included the inclusion/participation dimension, but, with the exception of Vanhanen, it became a minor element in these indices. Although Vanhanen’s index is especially interesting in respect to our purpose (the inclusion of immigrants, see below), its simplicity (he measures each dimension — competition and participation — with one single indicator) has received a lot of critique (e.g. Hadenius

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9 Bollen and Grandjean (1981) tested whether political liberties and popular sovereignty represent distinct dimensions. Since they operationalised popular sovereignty — which potentially could be seen as representing the republican strand of democratic theory or the inclusion/participation dimension, respectively — only with indicators that focused on elections, it does not come as a surprise that they could not empirically confirm the assumption that these two aspects represent distinct dimensions and proposed to combine these components into one scale called liberal democracy. As Coppedge et al. (2008) have shown, all measures applied by the Polity Index (with one exception: Openness of Executive Recruitment) empirically correspond to the contestation dimension, both Freedom House indices are highly correlated and represent the contestation dimension, and in their *Polyarchy* measure they deliberately skipped the one indicator that measures the inclusion dimension (suffrage) to get an unidimensional measure of contestation (Coppedge 2012: 23-33).
and Teorell 2005) and is out of touch with the dominant trend to make democracy measurement tools more differentiated and complex.

*The quality turn*

The last few years have witnessed what can be called *turns* in the field of democracy measurement. The first turn can be called the *quality turn* (e.g. Altman and Pérez-Liñàn 2002; Diamond and Morlino 2005; for an overview see Munck 2014). It starts with the following proposition: “The question is no longer whether a political system can be considered a democracy or not. Instead, researchers focus more and more on assessing the quality of established democracies” (Bühlmann et al. 2012: 520). The proponents of this *quality turn* argue that the major existing indices are not sensitive enough for measuring the subtle differences among established democracies and that they are based on a too minimalistic concept of democracy. Therefore, new and more fine-grained measurement tools are necessary.

In consequence, the Democracy Barometer (DemBar), clearly the theoretically most sophisticated and empirically most ambitious approach within the *quality turn*, builds on divergent democratic theories (liberal and participatory theories are mentioned explicitly, but egalitarian theories clearly play a role as well), and consists of a concept that includes three major dimensions (called principles: freedom, equality and control), three components for each dimension (called functions: individual liberties, rule of law, public sphere, transparency, participation, representation, competition, mutual constraints and governmental capacities), and about 100 indicators selected from a large collection of secondary data.

The DemBar started with measuring the quality of 30 so-called blueprint countries between 1995 and 2005 (continuously rated as full-fledged democracies by Freedom House and Polity) and draws its normative thresholds (minima and maxima) empirically on the basis of best and worst practices. Recently, both its temporal and geographical scope were expanded to cover 70 countries from 1990 to 2012 (Merkel and Bochsler et al. 2014a). In contrast to most other approaches within the *quality turn*, the

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10 On this basic level we can detect much overlap with Lauth (2004), who provides not only one of the most sophisticated theoretical accounts of democracy measurement, but a thorough critique of all indices that emerged in the 20th century.
Democracy Barometer does not make a fundamental distinction between determining the existence of democracy and measuring its quality (Munck 2014: 8), but it is clearly Euro-centric both in respect to the range of normative theories it takes into account and in respect to determining the thresholds. Furthermore, the conceptual architecture and especially the rules of aggregation are based on the idea of an “optimal balance” between the functions and principles of democracy (Bühlmann et al. 2012: 528).\footnote{However, although the idea of balancing has been kept, the aggregation formula has recently been adjusted (Merkel and Bochsler et al. 2014a: 10).}

Overall, the quality turn is a reflection of the assumption that, after the collapse of the communist bloc, the Western form of democracy is “the only game in town” (Schedler 1998), whilst it is acknowledged that “democracy is about more than elections” (Munck 2014: 3). At the same time when liberal democracy seems to prevail across the world, liberal theories of democracy became more criticized and contended than ever before, although, in contrast to Marxism, most recent critics do not aim at overcoming but at complementing liberalism (Held 2006; Saward 2001; Shapiro 2003). The designers of the DemBar tried to commensurate the goal of providing a comparative normative assessment of democracies on the basis of a universal standard with the recognition of a multitude of democratic theories by developing a rather maximalist concept of democracy and by introducing the idea of balancing into the conceptual architecture.

After facing massive criticism (in Switzerland) when presenting their results as a one-dimensional ranking of the 30 “blueprint democracies” (with Switzerland showing only a mediocre 14th place\footnote{See the NCCR Democracy Newsletter No. 8 (February 9, 2015)}), their framing of the main goals shifted from an overall assessment of democracies towards describing “different profiles of democracy” (Bühlmann et al. 2012: 528; see also Bochsler and Kriesi 2013). This change of emphasis is not only a result of the hostile reactions of the public, but reflects an adjustment to the second turn in democracy measurement, the variety turn, which has gained momentum in the meantime, and to which we now turn ourselves.\footnote{The debate on “democracy with adjectives” (Collier and Levitsky 1997) can be seen as a predecessor of the variety turn since it implies recognition of divergent kinds of democracies. Nevertheless, that debate was empirically driven and focused on innovations in concept formation (Goertz 2006: 80-83). The variety turn, in contrast, primarily represents recognition of the plurality in normative and empirical theories of democracy.}
The variety turn

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project is not only empirically the most ambitious recent project, it is also the theoretically most sophisticated one, and takes much of the criticism that has been raised against the traditional democracy measurement tools into account. For example, like the DemBar it aims to measure the degree or quality of democracies in a detailed and comprehensive way in order to be sensitive to differences in established democracies and to changes over time (Coppedge and Gerring et al. 2011: 249). But the most important conceptual turn is captured by the name of the project. By referring to many important works in democratic theory and studies of the concept of democracy, the authors come to the insight that “the goal of arriving at a single universally accepted measure of democracy is, in some very basic sense, impossible” (Coppedge and Gerring et al. 2011: 248).

As a consequence, this project started with no single definition of democracy, but with an attempt to identify the most important understandings of democracy. First, the proponents came up with the following list: electoral, liberal, majoritarian, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian understandings of democracy. Based on this list, they presented 33 “mid-level components” (Coppedge and Gerring et al. 2011) and, until now, they have collected data for almost 400 indicators covering 168 countries since 1900 (Coppedge et al. 2014a: 23-4). Later on, a seventh dimension or principle of democracy has been added – consensual democracy – although it is acknowledged that this principle might be nothing else than the opposite pole of majoritarian democracy (Coppedge et al. 2014b: footnote 1).

Even if one does not find each and every decision/description convincing (e.g. putting an independent judiciary into the box of electoral democracy), V-Dem represents an impressive alignment of concept formation and index building with the state of the art in democratic theory.14 It includes not only the most relevant current day expressions of the two large traditions in normative democratic theory (for liberalism: the electoral and liberal principles, for republicanism: the participatory and deliberative

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14 Evidence for this claim is the impressive list of references that is provided for each of the seven understandings/principles of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2014b: 3-6). Nevertheless, some important strands of democratic theory are not represented, for example Neo-Republicanism as laid out by Philip Pettit (2010, 2012).
principles\textsuperscript{15}) and the egalitarian principle as the non-revolutionary successor of Marxist theory, but with majoritarian and consensual principles it captures the most important expressions of the empiricist strand of democratic theory (the latter strand is based on the work of A. Lijphart, e.g. 1999). Furthermore, in its transparent and disaggregated form, the V-Dem project makes it possible – at least in principle – to fulfil what was promised when it was launched: it lets end-users decide which understanding of democracy to apply and accordingly how to aggregate the many indicators, components and dimensions/principles.

At the same time, the protagonists have begun to specify their own preferences in respect to the overall set-up of the concept: they treat electoral democracy as the core dimension of democracy and a basic level of electoral democracy as “fundamental: we would not want to call a regime without elections ‘democratic’ in any sense” (Coppedge et al. 2014b: 4). In other words, a certain level of electoral democracy is treated as a necessary condition for all forms of democracy. Furthermore, for all understandings/principles of democracy they specified a minimal definition and a more extended definition (with a broader set of indicators) (Coppedge et al. 2014b: 8-9). This leads to two kinds of indices for every understanding of democracy that is included: a narrow \textit{Electoral/Liberal/etc. component index} and a wider \textit{Electoral/Liberal/etc. democracy index} – wherein the latter usually includes the corresponding \textit{component index} and the \textit{electoral democracy index} (Coppedge et al. 2014a: 25-30).

Overall, the V-Dem project has many laudable features and does not only align democracy measurement to the most important discourses in democratic theory (whilst recognizing potential contradictions between different understandings of democracy without introducing the idea of balancing upfront as is case with the DemBar), but also to the state of the art in concept formation and measurement methodology. Nevertheless, we think that very important practical challenges for current day (nation-state) democracies – transnational (inter-)dependencies and migration – which have already made major inroads into the normative and empirical discourses in democratic theory – have not yet been taken into account sufficiently. Furthermore, even the latest

\textsuperscript{15} Proponents of deliberative democracy like Habermas claim that it is an approach beyond liberal and republican approaches, but these authors limit republicanism to its traditional and/or communitarian expression, which does not represent the broad spectrum of (neo-)republican theories.
projects do not really recognize the problems and trade-offs that we face when we form concepts and measurement tools which are supposed to serve two distinct goals: to measure variance in order to explain the causes and consequences of democratization/divergent forms of democracy and to measure divergence from normative standards with the purpose of assessing the quality of democracies or evaluating changes.

3. Democratic inclusiveness: A gap between practice/theory and measurement

At the beginning of this section, we show that the classical indicator for the inclusiveness of a polity – suffrage – became uninteresting for the designers of democracy measurement tools because in the second half of the 20th century it seemed to show no variance anymore. Furthermore, the specification of the second dimension of democracy shifted from inclusion to participation in both theory and measurement. Nevertheless, in recent years we have experienced a resurgence of the “problem of inclusion” (Dahl 1989) in political practice as well as in democratic theory. This renewed relevance has not yet been taken up in an adequate way within the democracy measurement tools.

The marginalization of inclusion
As argued above, the dominance of liberalism in Western democratic practice and theory in the second half of the 20th century is certainly one explanation why measures of competition/contestation became predominant in comparison to measures of inclusion/participation – Dahl’s second dimension of democracy/polyarchy. But there are further reasons. One can be traced back to the fact that most index developers have been primarily interested in causal analysis and therefore prefer unidimensional concepts (Coppedge et al. 2008: 632). A second one has to do with re-orientations in
non-liberal democratic theory shifting emphasis from *inclusion* (basically: formal rights to vote) to *participation* (actual use of different forms of political activity).\(^{16}\)

When M. Coppedge and W.H. Reinicke (1990) developed an index based explicitly on Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, they measured the inclusion dimension with a single indicator – the extent of suffrage/the right to vote.\(^ {17}\) After having collected the information for 170 nation-states for one year (1985), they excluded suffrage as an element of the *polyarchy index*. They did so based on two arguments which make sense within an approach to democracy measurement that is solely interested in causal analysis: they did not find very much variance anymore in respect to voting rights and preferred to have “a unidimensional scale of polyarchy that is identical to the scale of public contestation” (Coppedge and Reinicke 1990: 56). And indeed, if one is reducing the dimension of inclusion to the formal right to vote and is only concerned with the post-World War II period when former explicit exclusions based on wealth, race and sex had been overcome in Western countries, it might have been “reasonable” to focus on contestation and to exclude inclusion (Munck and Verkuilen 2009: 20).

Nevertheless, in line with Munck and Verkuilen (2009: 20), we think that the neglect of inclusion is a very serious omission for the measurement of democracy (even if we are only interested in explaining the causes and consequences of democratization):\(^ {18}\) First, because it misses one of the historically most important aspects of the struggles for democratization and changes our judgment of when countries started to be seen as democratic dramatically (think about Switzerland). Second, “universal suffrage” for all citizens was by no means already a global standard after World War II, and even in the Western world reached this status only at the end of the 1970s (Paxton et al. 2003). Third, the effective use of the right to vote varies greatly

\(^{16}\) For an account of why the inclusion of immigrants is particularly precarious when compared to other historically excluded groups see Bauböck (2002: 5). This special situation may also be part of the explanation why exclusions going beyond the (resident) citizenry are often perceived as ‘natural’ and thus in no (apparent) need of further attention.

\(^{17}\) Here, like in most cases, suffrage covers only active voting rights not passive voting rights (the right to stand up for election). The former is certainly the more important right, and therefore it is absolutely understandable that indices with a broad empirical scope focus on the active rights.

\(^{18}\) Coppedge later on changed his mind and showed that the second dimension of democracy – inclusiveness – “continues to be a relevant dimension of democracy despite the near-universal adoption of adult suffrage in countries that hold elections” (Coppedge et al. 2008: 645).
not only over time and between countries; rather, the extent of actual participation also makes a difference in respect to fundamental policies (Moon et al. 2006).

The latter point takes us to the second important reason for the demise of inclusion in democracy measurement – the rise of the notion of participation, which supplanted inclusion as the focal point in political struggles and democratic theory. Dahl (1971: 4-10) did not make any conceptual difference between the two terms, but used participation as a term to describe the process or practice of inclusion and inclusiveness to denote the corresponding feature of a political regime. In the process of democratization of the Western world, the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century were characterized by the fight to overcome formal exclusions based on class, gender and race (e.g. Bendix and Rokkan 1964). From the late 1960s onwards, social movements either practiced (e.g. demonstrations) or started to demand more intensive forms of political inclusion beyond electoral rights (e.g. referenda). Democratic theorists embraced this momentum in proposing neo-classical republican concepts like strong or participatory democracy (Pateman 1970; Barber 1984). Later on, the transformation of the Western world from industrial to information societies triggered the rise of the communication-centered theory of deliberative democracy (e.g. Habermas 1996 [1992]; Bohman and Rehg 1997; Bohman 1998).

In participatory as well as deliberative theories of democracy, the emphasis shifts from questioning who should be included to how and to which degree of intensity particular individuals/groups/interests/perspectives/discourses should be included into the political decision-making process. Of course, many of the proponents of participatory or deliberative democracy were proposing new, more active or direct forms of political participation or new procedures of interest formation and aggregation in order to overcome perceived exclusions (e.g. Young 2000; Benhabib 1996). But it was not anymore the de jure exclusion that has been the major concern but rather the de facto exclusion or the unequal influence of marginalized groups, which was seen as a result of underlying structural or informal factors in society. In other words, political struggles and theoretical discourses shifted from expanding the external boundary of the demos towards recognizing internal difference and fighting unjustified domination.

These changes in democratic practice and theory left their imprints on many projects within the quality turn of democracy measurement and in the incorporation of
the corresponding understandings of democracy into the DemBar and the V-Dem projects: In the Democracy Barometer participation is one of nine functions, which means it is represented on the second highest level within the concept architecture. In contrast, the term inclusion only shows up two levels lower, in the definition of two subcomponents of representation. Within the V-Dem project, participatory democracy is one of the seven principles and the participatory democracy index is one of the main indices. Inclusion is neither mentioned in the main conceptual framework nor on the level of indicators (two indicators contain the term exclusion, though). This prioritization is not just superficially terminological, but representative for the content and the weightings within these two democracy indices.

*Renewed interest in the “boundary problem”*

There is nothing wrong with taking participatory and deliberative theories of democracy on board when measuring and evaluating democracy, but this should not be done at the expense of the fundamental aspect of inclusion, since the external boundary of the demos is now once again at the forefront of political struggles in established democracies and one of the core issues of democratic theory. The renewed relevance of inclusion in theory and practice is the result of two developments which undermine the stability, congruence and legitimacy of the two boundary markers of modern polities (territoriality and nationality):

a. growing cross-border flows of information, financial capital, goods and “bads” (e.g. pollution) create increasing transboundary policy externalities and (inter-)dependencies, leading to practical and normative challenges to the sovereignty of territorially demarcated polities;
b. growing cross-border flows of people undermine the congruence between the resident population and the national citizenry and create large groups of non-citizen residents and non-resident citizens; this in turn undermines the status of formal membership in a national community as the natural and undisputed boundary of the demos.

The former development triggered liberal (Held 1995; Beitz 2000), deliberative (Bohman 2008) and republican (Pettit 2010) conceptualizations of cosmopolitan, transnational or multilateral democracies (for overviews see Brown and Held 2010), and intensive and ongoing debates on the criteria for delineating the boundary of the demos.
(e.g. MacDonald 2003; Näsström 2007; Miller 2009; Nootens 2010) as well as about the adequate specification of the democratic principle of inclusion in a Post-Westphalian world order (e.g. Goodin 2007; Näsström 2011; Owen 2009; Schaffer 2010; Beckman 2008, 2009). Once again, Robert Dahl has laid some conceptual foundations for this discourse. In his book *Democracy and its critics* (1989: 127) he specified the principle of inclusion by demanding that “every adult subject to a government and its laws” should be a member of the *demos* and should have political rights and equal opportunities to participate. In the Westphalian world of territorial states and sovereign national governments, this means that all (legal) residents, except children and transients, should be included. Nevertheless, in an earlier publication Dahl (1970 [1990]: 49) also stated that “[e]veryone who is affected by the decision of a government should have the right to participate in that government” and famously asked “whether there is not some wisdom in the half serious comment of a friend in Latin America who said that his people should be allowed to participate in our elections, for what happens in the politics of the United States is bound to have profound consequences for his country” (Dahl 1970 [1990]: 51).

In recent years, many theorists have started to take this comment more seriously and have discussed and proposed various ways for the inclusion or representation of affected externals in national politics. The debate on the *all-affected principle* goes far beyond the expansion of citizenship rights to all legal residents within territorial states – it questions the adequacy of the Westphalian definition of the boundary of the *demos* that is either based on formal membership or on territorial residency (Song 2009). In the context of a world characterized by strong flows and (inter-)dependencies across territorial and membership boundaries, a redefinition in accordance with the *all-affected principle* is certainly more in line with the universalistic aspirations of liberal democracy. It also seems to have deeper roots than a Westphalian *all subjected to law* specification.

Many scholars refer to the phrase “Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur” (what affects all should be approved by all) that is found in Justinian’s Code (Bauböck 2003: 26; Koenig-Archibugi 2012: 10). David Held (1995: 237) has argued “that decisions about public affairs should rest with those significantly affected by them”. He introduced three tests in order to assign policy issues, decision-making capacities and
rights to participate to various levels of governance: extensity of effects, intensity of affectedness and comparative effectiveness of the policy and the governance level (Held 1995: 236). For Mark Warren (2006: 386) a “robust norm of democracy” even demands that “every individual potentially affected by a collective decision should have an equal opportunity to influence the decision proportionally to his or her stake in the outcome.” This debate has so far neither led to a normative consensus among democratic theorists nor to a widespread change in democratic practice. But clearly John Rawl’s (1999) assumption that national peoples are the only legitimate bearers of rights and agency in the international realm is strongly challenged in normative theories of democracy. Many democratic theorists argue that individuals should complement peoples as principals in supra-national arenas of political decision-making (e.g. Held 1995, Beitz 2000, Cheneval 2011).

Furthermore, the focus on the supranational arena is getting complemented by the growing awareness of transnational arenas which emerge when horizontal (inter-)dependencies among national policies are becoming recognized, leading to the creation of institutions to deal with these interdependences uni-, bi- or multilaterally without turning to supranational institutions. Normative theorists have demanded that national polities should include people (or their representatives) who are neither residents nor citizens, but strongly affected by the external effects of national policies (e.g. König-Archibugi 2012; for an overview of these normative discourses and empirical realities see Schlenker and Blatter 2014). It is important to emphasize that the latter discourse proposes to democratize a globalized world not (just) by establishing and democratizing supranational institutions, but through the further expansion of the demos on the nation-state level in order to take the expanded external effects of national policy-making into account. Interestingly enough, these normative discourses have not yet made the slightest inroads into democracy measurement.19

International migration – the flow of people across state boundaries – has had a similar if not more fundamental impact on national politics and polities than the other flows.

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19 The V-Dem proponents correctly argue that different strategies of conceptualization and measurement of democracy are needed for measuring democracy on a global level or “where the political community is vaguely defined (e.g., transnational movements)” (Coppedge et al. 2014b: footnote 9). They ignore that the discourse on transnational forms of democracy has led to normative demands for making the established democracies on a nation-state level more inclusive.
across the boundaries of nation-states and received even more attention in democratic theory in recent decades (Hammar 1990; Bauböck 1994; Habermas 1996; Rubio-Marín 2000; Benhabib 2004; Bosniak 2006; Joppke 2010; Carens 2013). In democracy measurement, though – even in the newest approaches – it is relegated to a minor place. Part of the explanation is that this challenge to the naturalness of the boundary of the national *demos* has been debated mainly under the heading of citizenship and this discourse has spurred its own index building industry (for an overview: Helbling 2013). In the following, we point to the practical salience of immigration issues, and we scrutinize how this challenge has been taken up in democratic theory. Despite a widespread consensus among normative theorists that immigrant residents should be included into the *demos*, this demand has been sidelined in democracy measurement.

The challenge of migration for democracies shows up in the large proportions of people who live in a country in which they are not born and in the growing incongruence between residents and citizens. In the US, the percentage of non-citizen residents has risen from 2.3% in the 1970 to 7.6% in 2000, in some states and localities, the discrepancy is even much higher (e.g. in California non-citizen residents made up 20% of the adult population) (Song 2009: 608). In the European Union, 33 million people were born outside their country of residence and 20.7 million residents did not have the citizenship of their country of residence in 2012. The foreign-born part of the population was growing from 7.2% to 9.5% from 2000 to 2010. In all OECD countries the foreign-born population grew from 7.6% to 9.1% of the overall population (OECD 2013). These numbers show that immigrants are by far the largest group of adult residents who are currently excluded from the *demos* in established democracies (other groups are e.g. felons and people with mental disabilities; Beckman 2009; Blais, Massicotte and Ysoshinaka 2001; Caramani and Strijbis 2013). Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that questions of immigration (access to the territory), integration (access to the social and economic systems), incorporation (through cultural assimilation or by acceptance of difference) and inclusion (access to the political community, to the

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21 When considering that, if felons are disenfranchised at all, they make up a proportion of the population usually way below 1%, the relative importance of these various groups in terms of demography are more than clear.
demos) have been high on the agenda of political struggles in Western democracies and played a major role in the discourses of democratic theory.\textsuperscript{22}

In Europe, political struggles over immigration and naturalization policies have become core issues which reshape the dominant cleavage structures of the party systems (Kriesi et al. 2006) and in the US, immigrants and stances towards immigration policies play a major role in determining electoral outcomes (e.g. Ramirez 2013; Hawley 2013; Gimpel 2014; Rae Baerg, Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli 2014). In most European countries, liberals and conservatives have fought intensively over the question whether access to citizenship should be made easier or more restrictive and whether voting rights for aliens should be introduced or not (Bauböck et al. 2006; Joppke 2010). In the US, similar struggles have not yet led to a reform of the citizenship law on the federal level, but on the subnational level we find several efforts to facilitate the inclusion of immigrants (e.g. Hayduk 2014), as well as a wave of restrictive voter access policies (Bentele and O’Brian 2013).

The wide-spread consensus in democratic theory to include immigrant residents

In democratic theory, many proponents of group rights and of deliberative procedures have expanded their attention from traditional minorities to immigrants (e.g. Benhabib 2004). And despite all the differences between democratic theorists – for instance in respect to such fundamental questions as to whether democratic communities have an unlimited autonomy to restrict the access to their territory (Carens 1987, 2013; Abizadeh 2008, 2010; Miller 2010), whether the all affected, the all subjected, the stakeholder, or the social membership principles should guide the specification of the boundary of the demos (for an overview see Beckman 2009: chapter 2), or whether and how long emigrants should keep their citizenship and voting rights (López-Guerra 2005; Bauböck 2007) – we can detect an overlapping consensus among liberal egalitarian (Bauböck 1994; Rubio-Marin 2000), communitarian (Walzer 1983), neo-republican (Pettit 2012) and liberal nationalist (Miller 2008) theorists on the proposition that

\textsuperscript{22} There exists no uniform application of the terms integration, incorporation and inclusion in the literature or in the public discourse. We are aware that, for example, in America the term incorporation is used often synonymous to inclusion. Nevertheless, our assignments seem to be the most coherent and the term inclusion is clearly the most established one when we refer to the political community.
resident immigrants should be included into the *demos* of nation-states. Nevertheless, there are still differences between the concrete proposals of those theorists, for example whether inclusion should take place automatically or whether it should be a right that can be taken up voluntarily (Owen 2011), how illegal immigrants should be treated and how long immigrants have to reside within a nation-state before they should (get the right to) be included.

We will get back to these differences later on when we present pathways to account for the inclusion of immigrants in democracy measurement tools. But first we will briefly lay out the main arguments from the angles of different normative theories of democracy for the inclusion of immigrant residents in order to show how fundamentally their non-inclusion violates the core principles of these theories.

First, *liberals* are primarily concerned with the autonomy and equality of individuals, but they also take into account the preconditions that are necessary for the stability of the polity that is supposed to guarantee those values. Although liberals base their arguments partly on the idea of a social contract between the existing political community and the newcomer, this social contract cannot be the result of existing power distributions but must be in line with the fundamental normative principles of liberalism (Bauböck 1994: 53-151). Immigrant residents (in contrast to transients) are subjected to the same broad system of national laws, and as *de facto* members of the society of their country of residence they are “deeply affected” by the decisions of the corresponding polity (nation-state), which in turn is perceived as an instrument of the society to serve its self-determination. Furthermore, they rely on the services and protection of the state in order to freely and fully develop their individuality in a similar way as autochthonous residents do (Rubio-Marín 2000: 28). Therefore, both from a protective and from a developmental perspective on liberal democracy (for this distinction see Held 2006), the inclusion of immigrant residents is a strong normative demand. From a liberal perspective, the political community cannot decide on the inclusion of the immigrant on a discretionary basis, nor can it put any discriminatory demands on the immigrants as preconditions for inclusion. In order to secure the temporal stability and territorial integrity of the democratic polity, though, it can demand a certain time of residency and might limit its inclusiveness when the
established members of the polity are in danger to be outnumbered by newcomers (Bauböck 2011).

Second, drawing on Aristotle’s concept of the nature of human beings as zoon politikon, (neo-)classic republicanism emphasizes the value of political participation for individual self-realization and for collective self-determination. From this perspective, political participation is not merely an instrument to reach freedom. Rather, since a human being is by nature a political animal, it is in need of the possibility to act politically; thus, political participation is intrinsically valuable. In this vein, Benjamin Barber argues that democracy is not merely a form of political rule, but rather a “way of living” (Barber 2003 [1984]: 118). Immigrant residents thus need to be included politically, for without the possibility to participate, they do not only forego a means to protect their freedom, but are deprived of the possibility of human beings to live a humane life per se. Furthermore, if immigrants are excluded from the political community, this community’s self-determination as a democracy – built on active citizenship – is critically weakened.

A neo-republican point of view, drawing on republican Rome rather than on ancient Athens, is more concerned with the statuses and structures which ensure individuals’ and collectivities’ non-domination than with the intrinsic value of political participation. Freedom as non-domination requires the assurance of “some sphere or range of choices within which we need not fear others exercising arbitrary power or control over us [...]. This assurance, in turn, will be sufficiently resilient only when that protected sphere does not depend on the mere will or pleasure of others – that is, when it is protected by stable institutions that no political actor or small set of actors can upset unilaterally” (Lovett and Pettit 2009: 17). Therefore, the only way those living in a democracy can counter the danger of domination looming in their midst is for them to mutually recognize each other as equals. This is expressed by an equal status including all its bearers into “the joint exercise of these powers and capacities” (Bohman 2008: 199). Thus, also immigrants must carry such an equal status because otherwise they cannot be free, but will always live under the domination of those with this status who thereby exercise what is “the most common form of tyranny in the history of humankind”, namely “the political rule of citizens over non-citizens” (Walzer 1983: 62). Thus, because the institution of citizenship secures and expresses the recognition of an
equal status, “genuine freedom from domination requires the extension of equal 
citizenship rights to everyone” (Lovett and Pettit 2009: 17).

The limited inclusion of (immigrant) inclusion in democracy measurement

Given the growing discrepancy between the resident population subjected to the law of 
the polity on the one hand and the members of the demos entitled to contribute to the 
making of these laws in most democracies on the other hand, and given the broad 
consensus in normative democratic theory that this gap undermines the quality of 
democracy, it is surprising that even the most recent democracy measurement projects 
have taken up this obvious challenge to the inclusiveness of democracies on the margins 
only.

The Democracy Barometer (DemBar) measures the electoral inclusiveness of 
democracies in respect to migrants on the level of two sub-components: a) suffrage, which covers active voting rights; and b) no legal constraints for inclusion of minorities in respect to passive voting rights/candidacy rights. In the following, we will just 
scrutinize and discuss the way immigrant inclusion/exclusion is taken into account in 
the suffrage sub-component. That is, we refrain from discussing the second sub-
component in detail as it is very similar and thus shows the same shortcomings. 
Suffrage is measured by two indicators, one measuring the requirements and 
disqualifications for active suffrage and the other measuring the registered voters as a 
percentage of the so-called voting age population. The latter indicator is taken from a 
database of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 
However, in contrast to what is suggested by its name, the indicator voting age 
population only includes citizens above the legal voting age – which means that non-
naturalized immigrants are not taken into account. For the first indicator, an early

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23 The sub-component suffrage is one of three sub-components of the component equality of participation which, in 
turn, is one of two components of the function of participation. The sub-component no legal constraints for 
inclusion of minorities is one of three sub-components of the component descriptive representation, which is one 
of two components of the function of representation (Merkel and Bochsler et al. 2014a).

24 See the definition and further caveats discussed here: tiny.cc/whyVAPisnotVAP (February 9, 2015). 
Unfortunately, this does not correspond to how this indicator is described and used (Merkel and 
Bochsler et al. 2014b: 44; Bochsler and Kriesi 2013: 75-6, 78). Besides, the usage of numbers of 
registered voters based on official registries can be problematic as they often include double entries or 
even dead people, and thus their validity is flawed. Taken together, this must be the reason why the 
actual percentages of this indicator sometimes exceed the value of 100 (Bochsler and Kriesi 2013: 98-9), and why this was subsequently corrected (Merkel and Bochsler et al. 2014b: 44).
version of the DemBar drew on the study of Paxton et al. (2003). In this study, the exclusion of non-citizens was taken into account at the margins only.\textsuperscript{25}

In the current version of the DemBar, a new suffrage indicator is used, which documents requirements (age higher than 18, citizenship, citizenship by birth, waiting time after nationalization, residency) and disqualifications (insanity, conviction, imprisonment, suspension, office, others). With most elements in the list of requirements, the DemBar thus acknowledges that the inclusion of migrants is a relevant aspect of democracy measurement. Nevertheless, there is a lot of room for improvement, both in respect to the selection as well as to the weighting of the criteria. The general citizenship requirement is certainly an important indicator for the inclusiveness of a democracy towards immigrants (as is residency in respect to emigrants); and in principle it seems adequate to look more carefully at potential restrictions for immigrants in comparison to restrictions for emigrants – by applying additional requirement-indicators, as is the case right now. But we could not find any justification neither for the selection of the specific requirements that are taken into account nor for the implicit weighting.\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, only \textit{de jure} regulations are taken into account, not the number of people who are actually excluded by these rules.\textsuperscript{27} Given this caveat, it is especially problematic not to measure the rules that regulate access to citizenship (and the resulting naturalization rates), since citizenship and naturalization laws to a large extent determine the degree to which residents are excluded if there is a citizenship requirement for voting.

Finally, we want to stress the fact that even after the latest changes, the DemBar project takes the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of democracies in respect to migrants only

\textsuperscript{25} While only one out of 23 indicators on specific suffrage restrictions takes into account “excessive naturalization and nationality requirements” (restriction 8 in Paxton et al. 2003: 114), another one even explicitly treats the general requirement of citizenship not as a relevant restriction for suffrage at all (restriction 9 in Paxton et al. 2003: 115).

\textsuperscript{26} To code and aggregate the various restrictions, a summative scale of mostly dichotomous and equally weighted items is used. For example, if citizenship is required, the code is 1; if it is not required, the code is 0. But for some disqualifications, a third category (code 2) is introduced in order to capture more nuances in the respective criterion. As a result, the potential maximum for exclusion covering all five requirements and six disqualifications would be a score of 17 points. And ultimately, the implicit weighting in this simple aggregation procedure means that excluding immigrants does not count as much as excluding felons.

\textsuperscript{27} This, of course, is to be captured by the indicator \textit{registered voters as a percentage of the voting age population}. But as stated above, while it may cover other categories adequately, this measurement fails to capture non-naturalized immigrants.
into account on the lowest level of abstraction within the conceptual tree; and in all three instances that now account for this aspect – the two indicators discussed as well as the additional one measuring candidacy rights mentioned above – determine less than half of the score of one individual indicator. Overall, thus, the inclusion of immigrants is covered by only about one single indicator out of a total of 100 indicators.

At first glance, the Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem) project fares better when it comes to recognizing the relevance of immigrant inclusion/exclusion for comparing democracies. Right from the beginning, the extension of male and female suffrage has been listed as an important aspect to be measured (Coppedge and Gerring et al. 2011: 255), and the suffrage index is part of the electoral component index, which in turn accounts for a third of the electoral democracy index. The latter index is especially important within the V-Dem project since “electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other” (Coppedge et al. 2014a: 25-6). In consequence, the electoral democracy index and with that the suffrage index is part of all major indices that the makers of the V-Dem project have put forward. Yet, a closer view reveals that the suffrage index applies to citizens only and does neither take restrictions based on age, residency, or citizenship nor any other restriction into consideration. Besides, it only covers legal restrictions, not those that may operate in practice (Coppedge et al. 2014a: 46). The suffrage index covers restrictions based on gender, property, tax payment, income, education, region, race, ethnicity, religion and/or economic independence. This means that it is geared to trace when and to what extent the classical criteria for exclusion have been overcome throughout the world. This might be acceptable (which does not mean that it is the best solution, as we will argue below), if the goal is to cover the long-term development of all countries in the world, but it constitutes a clear gap for those who want to apply the V-Dem data for measuring and comparing the quality of established democracies.

The good news is that the V-Dem project has also gathered data that is relevant for measuring the inclusiveness of democracies in times of migration. In the third and current version of the codebook we find no less than 125 indicators introduced for providing a comprehensive picture of the concept of electoral democracy (Coppedge et al. 2014a). Among those 125 indicators there are two indicators which capture the
inclusion/exclusion of immigrants and emigrants: The first indicator measures the “percentage of the people residing in the country (or colony) that do not enjoy the legal right to vote in national elections because they are not full citizens” (Coppedge 2014a: 46). The second indicator provides dichotomous information on whether the diaspora and/or citizens abroad can vote. However, neither does this second indicator provide the number of external people who can vote nor would it set this number into a relation to either all non-resident citizens or to the number of residents who have the right to vote.

This means that the V-Dem project is making first important steps to account for the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of democracies in respect to migrants. We will have long-term data sets for both – the inclusion of immigrants and the inclusion of emigrants. Nevertheless, the makers of the V-Dem project still treat inclusion, especially the inclusion of migrants, on the margins only, as becomes obvious on various levels. A first example is the definition of the indicator percentage of population with suffrage (v2x-suffr): Against what the term population implies, this indicator only measures the share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) that has the legal right to vote in national elections (Coppedge et al. 2014a: 46). This definition, which bases suffrage on citizenship and not on residency, has major implications because this suffrage indicator is included in the concept that forms the very core of all democracy indices within the V-Dem project – the electoral component index. As already mentioned, all indices that are developed within the V-Dem project include the electoral component index – either directly or through the inclusion of the electoral democracy index – and this means that the suffrage indicator is part of each and every index that grows out of the V-Dem project. And there is yet another reason why the definition of the suffrage indicator is crucially important for all outcomes of the V-Dem project: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link, which means that the mode of aggregation is multiplication of the four indicators which form the components of this index: freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executives (de jure) (Coppedge et al. 2014a: 25). In other words, each of the four components is seen as a necessary condition for making elections sufficient to secure the responsiveness and accountability of political leaders. However, in the current state of the V-Dem project, only leaders’ responsiveness and accountability towards citizens,
and not towards all those who are subject to their rule and law, let alone towards all those affected by their rule and law. Here we see room for improvement, as we will lay out in the next section.

Overall, we can conclude that (in contrast to many important democracy indices developed in the 20th century), the recent democracy measurement tools take the fundamental dimension of inclusion into account once again, and recognize the inclusion/exclusion of immigrants as a relevant element of inclusion. However, at least so far, they treat this element on the side-lines only. The DemBar has started to compile data that indicate the de jure inclusiveness of democracies in respect to non-citizen residents, whereas the V-Dem project will come up with data showing the percentage of the resident population that is de facto excluded as non-citizens. Both ignore the rules and the realities that influence or characterize the process of including immigrants into the demos via access to citizenship. This is all the more surprising since the last years have witnessed the emergence of sophisticated indices and detailed databases providing exactly this kind of information (see Helbling 2013 for an overview).

4. Including and indexing democracies inclusiveness in respect to immigrants: pathways for aligning measurement to theory

Although we are convinced that in times of growing socio-economic flows and (inter)dependencies across borders and of limited democratic support for supranational forms of governance the inclusion of affected externals (through representatives) into the democratic decision-making process of nation-states represents a very important pathway for democratizing a Post-Westphalian world order (Blatter and Schlenker 2013), we here limit ourselves to scrutinizing the ways in which democracy measurement can take into account the practical relevance of and the normative demand for including immigrant residents.28 The major reason for this approach is the fact that we have identified a widespread normative consensus on the need for nation-state based democracies to include this group of people, whereas no

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28 Blatter (2011) indicates that the growth of dual citizenship and the increasing recognition of dual citizenship by nation states might be both empirically and normatively promising starting points for a process which helps to fulfil the broader normative demand (for including strongly affected externals) by facilitating the more narrow demand (including immigrant residents).
such consensus exists in respect to the inclusion of emigrants and affected non-citizen non-residents.

In the following, we will thus scrutinize three different ways in which the inclusion/exclusion of immigrants can be better taken into account in democracy indices. These ways are aligned to the three main goals for which democracy indices are developed and used for:

a. Explaining the causes/preconditions for and the effects/consequences of democratization
b. Comparing the configurations/varieties that characterize different kinds of democracies
c. Evaluating the normative quality of democracies

The V-Dem projects aims at goals a and b, whilst the proponents of the DemBar have invoked goals b and c. Nevertheless, we think that there are not only overlaps but also trade-offs among these three goals, and that indices can be optimized only in respect to one goal at a time (for a critique of the often unreflective conflation of explanatory and evaluative goals in democracy measurement, see Beckman 2008). This will become clear in the following when we scrutinize the different options for measuring the inclusiveness of democracies in respect to immigrants. For the first two goals, we discuss how the indicators and indices of the V-Dem project can be adjusted internally or complemented externally with a view to taking the inclusion of immigrants into account more adequately.29 For the last goal, we present and justify the main dimensions and components of an index that we perceive as the nucleus of a comprehensive (normative) assessment of democracies in respect to their inclusiveness in times of migration, the immigrant inclusion index (IMIX).

**Measuring inclusiveness for explaining democratization**

Indices that aim to measure and explain the long-term processes of democratization should:

a. recognize that inclusion is not only a fundamental dimension of democratization, but a necessary condition that cannot be substituted by other features of democracy – and this

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29 We concentrate on the V-Dem project since this project covers the first two goals. The DemBar, in contrast, started with the aim to evaluate established democracies. Instead of scrutinizing how the DemBar could take the inclusion/exclusion of immigrants better into account, we concentrate on presenting the major decisions that we made on our way to develop an immigrant inclusion index (IMIX).
insight should, accordingly, be taken into account in the conceptualization and rules of aggregation;

b. focus on electoral inclusion, since it is the most essential form of inclusion and because of data availability and reliability is best in this area;

c. apply an understanding of inclusiveness that is mainly based on normative theory instead of focusing on the empirical conventions of the day, and that is open to all potential expansions of the demos.

Ad a) Those who are concerned with the long-term processes of democratization and its preconditions and consequences should not only not ignore the aspect of inclusion, they should recognize it as a fundamental dimension of democracy that cannot be substituted by elements of other dimensions. If elections, deliberations or direct forms of political participation are highly exclusive, this cannot be offset by a higher level or more intensive forms of electoral contestation, public deliberation or direct participation within this exclusive demos. In consequence, indicators that measure the inclusiveness of a polity should get an adequate place or weighting in indices which are supposed to express the overall level of democratization.

Ad b) We fully agree with the now common wisdom that “democracy is about more than elections” (see above), but we also follow the V-Dem project’s assumption that elections are essential for democracy, something that amounts to the slogan “democracy is nothing without elections.” Dahl (1971: 4) pointed out that “[t]he right to vote in free and fair elections partakes of both dimensions” of democratization. When elections take place regularly and when they are free and fair, this contributes to liberalization/contestation, but we need to know who has the right to vote (and who voted) in order to determine how much democratization has taken place in respect to inclusion (and participation). Since elections are the sine qua non for determining the degree of contestation within a polity, they are also indispensable for measuring its inclusiveness. Below we discuss how this essential aspect can be complemented in order to get a more full-fledged picture of the inclusiveness of democracies and to map the varieties by which democracies can be inclusive, but for those who want to measure the long-term developments of democracy, it seems wise to concentrate on electoral inclusion. There are not only theoretical but also practical reasons for this stance: If we
want to measure the inclusiveness of polities in the 19th century, there is much more (and more reliable) data available for measuring electoral inclusion in comparison to the indicators that the V-Dem project applies for measuring the inclusiveness of deliberations (e.g. range of consultation, engaged society; see Coppedge et al. 2014a).

*Ad c*) Indices that try to capture long term developments should be as open and neutral/descriptive as possible (Beckman 2008: 42-3). In contrast to Beckman, we do not think that a non-normative definition of inclusiveness is actually possible. Nevertheless, we agree with Beckman that what he calls a minimalist definition should be avoided, since *de facto* it comes down to ignoring the inclusiveness dimension entirely (as it is the case with the *Polity Index*). As already argued, such ignorance makes it impossible to trace earlier waves of expanding the boundary of the *demos*. And we would be unable to capture the current trends to push this boundary even further. Furthermore, a definition should not be conventionalist in the sense that the definition of inclusiveness itself is based on what is widely accepted in reality at a specific point in time. Instead, it should reflect the normative discourse in democratic theory – like measurement tools generally do, as we have shown before. Currently, there seems to be a wide-spread consensus among normative democratic theorists that all permanent residents should be included into the *demos*. We also pointed to the fact that intensive debates have started on whether non-adults and affected non-residents should be included as well, but here we are far away from a consensus.

Based on these arguments, we urge the makers and users of the V-Dem project to include their indicator *resident noncitizens who cannot vote* (indicator 3.15, Coppedge et al. 2014a: 46) into the *electoral component index* (index 1.1, Coppedge et al. 2014a: 25), which would give the most important aspect of inclusion in times of migration the weight it deserves in democracy measurement. In addition, we suggest that it seems much more important to measure the percentage of the population that is excluded by voting-age than to measure other *de jure* exclusions to universal suffrage beyond voting age. In line with Beckman (2009: 90-119), we think that the inclusion of non-adults represents another important “frontier of democracy.” But in contrast to Beckman, we think that numbers play a major role. In most countries the number of excluded non-adults clearly exceeds the number of excluded adult residents and this
represents an important deviance from the *all subjected principle*. Furthermore, those who propose to include minors (directly or represented by their parents) justify their demand with demographic trends which give rise to the “rule of the old” (cf. López-Guerra 2012; Sànchez Gassen 2015: 252-67).

Finally, instead of just registering whether citizens abroad are allowed to vote (in a simplified dichotomous fashion that fails to capture more nuanced degrees of exclusion), it would be much more important to count the number of non-residents who are allowed to vote in national elections, and the number of non-residents who actually voted from abroad in order to systematically track this form of “expansive citizenship” which seems to be the currently most important trend that leads to a more inclusive *demos* (Bauböck 2005). We should not forget that electoral democracy is about counting (in order to secure the value of equality, see Näström 2010; Moon et al. 2006). In consequence, when we want to capture the level of electoral inclusiveness, we need indicators that reflect not only rules but also numbers in order to gauge the relevance of specific exclusions or inclusions for the overall inclusiveness of a democracy.

*Mapping the varieties of democratic inclusiveness*

If we follow the core insight of the V-Dem project, we should start with the assumption that there exist not only different forms of democracy but also different forms of inclusion. An index designed to map the different ways in which democracies can be inclusive should go beyond electoral inclusion and complement the extent of suffrage with other forms of inclusiveness. A first step is to define what inclusion actually means in electoral, liberal, participatory, majoritarian/consensus, deliberative and egalitarian understandings of democracy. This would be a task for a full-fledged article on its own. Here we can only identify indicators within the V-Dem project that might be useful for such an endeavor. The next step is to identify indicators that specifically trace the inclusiveness of democracies with respect to immigrants.

In the following, we provide two examples for the first step and discuss how the results could be aggregated into a *democratic inclusiveness index* (DIX). Since we could not find any other further indicator within the V-Dem project that provides information about the inclusion of immigrants beyond the one that we have already discussed, we
take up the second step in the next section, where we present our project to develop an immigrant inclusion index (IMIX).

Within an electoral understanding of democracy, suffrage is not the only aspect that touches upon democratic inclusiveness. The V-Dem project provides further indicators that can be taken into account when we want to get a comprehensive picture of the electoral inclusiveness of a polity (Coppedge et al. 2014a). Indicator 3.5 displays candidate restrictions by ethnicity, race, religion, or language; and indicator 3.17 shows whether restrictions exist in respect to female suffrage. Other indicators that are important for a broad picture of the electoral inclusiveness of a country are the following: 3.31 election voter registry, 3.70 election voting-age population turn out, and 3.91 lower chamber election statutory threshold, since they are all clearly focused on elections and capture further potential hurdles for making the electoral process accessible for the entire population.

If we want to make the measurement of electoral inclusiveness more sensitive towards immigrants, we have to add further indicators that are not yet included in the V-Dem project. For example, we could add indicators that capture regulations that specifically reduce de jure/de facto the possibilities/probabilities of naturalized citizens or immigrants who are granted voting rights to register or to vote. As we already mentioned, the DemBar project has already started to collect data in respect to the question whether there is an additional waiting time for immigrants after naturalization before they are allowed to vote and whether citizenship by birth is necessary to get voting rights. Another indicator could target the naturalization rate or the voter turnout among naturalized citizens or immigrants who are granted voting rights.

Since liberalization and inclusion had been identified as distinct dimensions of democratization by Dahl, one could argue that inclusiveness does not play a role within a liberal understanding of democracy. Nevertheless, within a liberal understanding of democracy, this aspect is captured by the liberal emphasis on equal rights for all. It might be argued that all these aspects belong to an egalitarian understanding of democracy, but we think that we are in line with the V-Dem proponents when we assign

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30 However, it should be noted that the V-Dem uses the same source for voting age population as the DemBar, and therefore has the same limitations (see footnote 19).

31 However, besides the fact that turnout figures are often unreliable, collecting specific turnout figures of enfranchised immigrants or naturalized citizens may not be possible due to limited data availability.
all aspects that focus on equal rights to the liberal, and all further concerns with equality to the egalitarian understanding of democracy.

Within the V-Dem project, we find the following indicators covering several aspects of the *equality before the law and individual liberties index* that would certainly have to be taken into account for a *liberal inclusiveness index*: 10.8 to 10.11, indicators that trace *freedom of foreign and domestic movement*, the *access to justice index* (10.24), and the indicator that measures the *equality among social groups in respect for civil liberties* (10.26). In some countries, these aspects might be very important for immigrants, but the indicators, as defined right now, are not tailor-made to capture the level of inclusion/exclusion that immigrants face from a liberal perspective. This becomes most obvious when we take a closer look at how the indicator that measures the equality among social groups in respect to civil liberties is operationalized. Among the criteria by which groups are distinguished we find many relevant aspects (e.g. language, religion), but not citizenship. From a liberal point of view, it would be very important to have data on the extent of civil, social, and economic rights of non-citizen residents as compared to sedentary citizens.

After having assembled a list of those indicators within the V-Dem project which are – from a theoretical point of view – relevant for capturing electoral, liberal, participatory, majoritarian/consensual, deliberative and egalitarian understandings of democracy, one could accordingly develop electoral/liberal/participatory etc. inclusion indices, which could then in a second step be aggregated to an overall *democratic inclusiveness index* (DIX). In addition, one could do the same with a more specific focus on the inclusion of immigrants. Since the V-Dem project will not provide adequate data to that end, the latter task is much more demanding. Nevertheless, since we believe that the exclusion of immigrant residents is currently one of the most significant deficits of national democracies, we have started such an endeavor, albeit still in a very limited way. We will sketch this in the next section.

But before we want to emphasize that whilst each theoretically consistent index (e.g. a *liberal inclusion index*) should be unidimensional, which can be tested empirically and adjusted in an inductive manner, this is not the case with the suggested comprehensive index (DIX). The DIX can, but does not have to be unidimensional in order to be consistent with theory. Given the presumption of the V-Dem project that
there are different acceptable normative theories of democracy, we would assume that the overall index is multidimensional. From a descriptive/explanatory point of view it is questionable whether such a meta-index makes sense. After all, the primary goal is to provide a picture of the different ways in which democracies are inclusive (in respect to immigrants).

The adequate next step would be to try to explain the difference in the kind of inclusiveness, and not in inclusiveness overall. Yet, as is well known, it is technically possible to come up with a unidimensional ranking of countries even on the basis of such an index, and undoubtedly somebody will not be able to resist. Those who do causal analysis, though, should be aware that the different forms of inclusion (measured by a plurality of diverse indicators which are integrated into theoretically coherent indices) almost certainly have different causes and consequences. Therefore, the different inclusiveness indices should be applied separately in causal analysis. Alternatively, if the goal is to analyze the causes and/or consequences of the overall inclusiveness of democracies, one has to theorize, model and test the causal mechanisms on the level of the constitutive dimensions (Goertz 2006: 6) – in this case with respect to the theoretically specific indices of inclusion.

**Justifying normative standards, weightings and prisms/focal points for assessing the quality of democratic inclusiveness**

Each index that aims to assess the quality of democracies must explicitly define normative standards of democratic inclusiveness and justify those with reference to normative theories of democracy. We will briefly discuss our corresponding project entitled the *immigrant inclusion index* (IMIX), an index that we so far applied to 22 European democracies and that can hopefully serve as a nucleus for more encompassing assessment projects (Blatter, Schmid and Blättler 2015). In the foregoing sections we have already provided arguments why it makes sense to start such a project by looking at the inclusion of immigrants (because there exists a widespread consensus in normative theory) and why we focus on electoral inclusiveness/voting rights (due to theoretical and practical reasons).

In the following, we concentrate on three further decisions that have to be taken when developing an assessment tool with a sound normative basis:
One has to discuss and answer the question of when or under which conditions are democracies expected to include immigrant residents by an explicit normative standard.

One has to reflect on the democratic (dis)advantages of the two possible pathways towards electoral inclusion – access to citizenship or alien voting rights – in order to reach a corresponding weighting scheme.

One has to discuss the relationship between the two options for how to understand and measure the inclusiveness of a democracy: either by looking at the formal rules which reflect the explicit will of the political community to be in/exclusive (applying de jure indicators) or by measuring how inclusive the polity is in its actual functioning (applying de facto indicators) – in order to decide whether a high level of de jure inclusiveness can compensate for a low level of de facto inclusiveness, and vice versa.

Here, we cannot display all the arguments that we took into account when taking these decisions for the IMIX (they can be found in Blatter, Schmid and Blättler 2015). We just want to point to two important questions on which we have not yet found much theoretical and methodological reflection in the literature:

- What are the implications of the recognition of diversity within democratic theory for democracy measurement tools which are explicitly developed for assessing the quality of (arguably diverse) democracies?
- Whether and if so, how much, should we take the de facto situation into account next to the de jure situation when assessing the quality of a democracy?

Each decision on the way of developing democracy measurement tools should be taken with explicit reference to democratic theory. This norm, although much room for improvement exists in practice, is not disputed in principle. Yet, when we recognize theoretical diversity, the line from democratic theory to measurement is not straightforward, not only when it is not made explicit, but also because different theories (might) imply different and even contradictory measurements. When it comes to making assessment decisions, theoretical diversity can potentially lead to the following three situations:

- There exists an overlapping consensus;
- we can find a decent and well justified compromise; or
- the theories lead to contradictory conclusions.
In the following, we will indicate that when designing our assessment tool we were faced with all three situations:

Ad a) As indicated, all normative theorists, in principle, agree on the norm that immigrants have to be politically included. They do not have the same arguments and there are differences in the details, but the principle in undisputed. This is why we focused on immigrants when we started the larger endeavor to measure inclusion in times of cross-border flows and (inter-)dependencies (thereby ignoring the affected non-residents). When it comes to the question whether states have the legitimate right to condition the inclusion into the demos, we face the situation that almost all theoretical accounts argue that immigrants indeed should reside on a nation-state territory for some time before they (should have the right to) get included into the demos. Other forms of conditionalization – e.g. language requirements or kinds of knowledge/skills that are tested in naturalization tests – are much more disputed in the literature (see for example the diverging contributions in Bauböck and Joppke 2010). Since we wanted to start with a rather cautionary normative base line, we only took residency requirements into account. In other words, when it comes to making fundamental decisions on what to focus on, we followed the logic of an overlapping consensus.

Ad b) Our decision to take five years of residency as a normative threshold for determining when an immigrant should be included follows a different rationale. Here, we are not faced with a categorical decision on what to focus on, but with a decision for a best solution on a metric scale. A threshold of five years first and foremost represents a compromise between the divergent stances that we deduce from different normative theories; secondly, we justify the five years with reference to a political criterion (in contrast to socio-economic or cultural criteria): a long legislative period (Blatter, Schmid and Blättler 2015).

Ad c) We found quite divergent arguments in respect to the question whether immigrants should better be included into the demos via access to citizenship or via alien voting rights (Blatter, Schmid and Blättler 2015: 21-24). Since most established
lines of argumentation favor access to citizenship we start with an aggregation rule that gives it three times as much weight as alien voting rights. Nevertheless, we later on show that more recent theories of democracy deliver additional arguments for alien voting rights, which is why we add an aggregation scheme that weights both options equally (Blatter, Schmid and Blättler 2015: 48-52, Appendix III). The different weighting schemes do not change the variance among the European countries in respect to immigrant inclusiveness very much (and in consequence, neither their ranking in the IMIX). But they change the absolute values with the consequence that the gap between the normative standard and the empirical reality is getting even bigger for most states. In other words, the theoretical debate on which pathway to inclusion is better matters not much for those who are interested in explanation, but it makes quite a difference for those who evaluate democracies from a normative point of view. This insight has major implications for the discussion on how to develop indices – it shows that there are trade-offs between the two major goals: explanation and evaluation. Because most current indices are tailor-made for explanatory purposes, they might not be the most adequate for evaluating the quality of democracies, if this evaluation should be based on normative standards (and not on best/worst practice).

The last point that we want to address is the relationship between de jure and de facto in democracy measurement. Both the DemBar and the V-Dem project include indicators that measure legal norms and regulations and indicators that measure the actual practice; and the DemBar project has been applauded for doing so (Jäckle et al. 2013: 112). While in the DemBar the inclusion of immigrants is taken up only in de jure indicators, the V-Dem project tries to capture this aspect with the de facto indicator called resident noncitizens who cannot vote (see description above). What is missing, though, is a thorough discussion of the relevance of de jure and de facto aspects for measuring and judging democratization/inclusiveness. Is it really adequate to relegate this question to the level of operationalization instead of the much more important level of concept formation – as it is currently the case in existing democracy indices? We think that it is more adequate – both for causal analysis and for normative evaluations – to see the de jure and the de facto aspects as two distinct focal points/prism when looking at processes of democratization/inclusion. For causal analysis this is important in as much as the de jure and the de facto aspect have very different causes and
consequences. When we use the measurement tools for normative assessments, we have to reflect on the question whether the polity is responsible for the *de facto* situation in the same way as it is for the *de jure* situation (Blatter, Schmid and Blättler 2015). In consequence, we argue that we should recognize *de jure* and *de facto* as the most fundamental dimensions when measuring these concepts.

5. **Summary and concluding remarks**

The most recent democracy measurement endeavors have to be applauded as major steps forward by all those who are interested in the normative evaluation and in the comparison of democracies, but also by those who try to provide systematic answers to questions about the causes and consequences of the process of democratization/of the divergent kinds of democracies. They adequately take into account many developments in democratic theory and in concept formation. Nevertheless, inclusion, an absolutely central dimension of democracy, is still very much side-lined. We showed that the renewed interest – of both political practice and democratic theory – in the question of who is to be included into the *demos* has not yet been taken into account adequately within democracy measurement tools.

In practice and theory, we detect various “frontiers of democracy” (Beckman 2009), and respective struggles for expansions of the *demos*. But nowhere do we experience such a stark discrepancy between a widely accepted normative standard on the one hand, and the reality of many democracies on the other hand, as when it comes to the inclusion of immigrant residents. Therefore, in our plea for taking the overall dimension of inclusion more seriously in democracy measurement, we focused on this group and developed suggestions how democracy measurement tools can take the inclusiveness in respect to immigrants into account. When we developed our own index that focuses on evaluating the inclusiveness of democracies in respect to immigrant residents, we stumbled across two fundamental questions: how far do we have to follow the same rules of concept formation and aggregation when we aim to evaluate democracies in comparison to when we want to explain the causes and consequences of democratization/democratic variety? How important is the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto*? In the literature on concept formation we could not find satisfying
answers; these questions have not even attracted much attention – another gap to be closed.

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