The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures

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Critical junctures are a crucial element of social science accounts that center on historical causation. But definitions and applications of this concept have focused more heavily on the criticality of certain junctures – on understanding why changes that originate in certain historical moments have long-term and transformative impact – than on what a juncture is. In this paper, I seek to define critical junctures by focusing not on their effects, but on what distinguishes these periods from the rest of the historical record.

In brief, I begin from the insight that the causal structure of the critical juncture has been insufficiently elaborated. While taking on board the insights about the importance of mechanisms of reproduction in sustaining or producing outcomes after the critical juncture, and Slater and Simmons' recent conceptual innovation of critical antecedents, I focus here on the nature of the juncture itself.¹ I argue that the distinct feature of a historical juncture that has the potential to be critical is the loosening of the constraints of structure to allow for agency or contingency to shape divergence from the past, or divergence across cases. Many critical juncture accounts implicitly describe this loosening of constraints, but we have not incorporated that insight into our conceptual framework, or into strategies of systematic empirical investigation. This paper attempts to fill that gap.

To do so, I argue that we must distinguish between two types of causal conditions at work during the critical juncture: the permissive conditions that represent the easing of the constraints of structure and make change possible, and the productive conditions that, in the presence of the permissive conditions, produce the outcomes or range of outcomes that are then reproduced over time after the permissive conditions disappear.

In what follows, I begin by elaborating my conceptualization of these two types of causal conditions, distinguishing among them, and discussing their relationship to the other components of critical junctures: critical antecedents and mechanisms of reproduction. I then trace through several classics that apply the

¹ Collier and Collier (1991, 27) describe a variety of ways in which critical junctures might vary: the relative importance of agency and structure, the duration, and the causal weight in the outcome of interest. In my mind, a more fundamental issue is the causal structure of the critical juncture itself.
critical juncture framework, and show all contain both permissive and productive conditions – though these conditions interact differently with one another and with the antecedent conditions. I conclude by showing several costs of the failure to identify these conditions separately and explicitly: it has implications for case selection and hypothesis testing, for resolving debates about the definition of critical junctures and their temporal duration, for investigation of negative cases, and (most broadly) for theories of institutional change.

The example of import-substitution industrialization:
To illustrate the framework of the critical juncture that I propose, I begin with the example of the experience of import substitution industrialization (ISI)\(^2\) in some Latin American countries but not others. After several decades of emphasis on export-led growth, the middle of the 20th century saw a dramatic shift away from export promotion toward the development of industry for domestic markets. This shift began as an ad-hoc response to the effects of the Great Depression, which brought world trade to a crashing halt as protectionism in the developed world eliminated the markets for Latin America’s primary product exports. After 1929, Latin American exports confronted “a dramatic change in global economic conditions: a fall in economic activity in the industrialized countries, a fall in the value of world trade, high interest rates, appreciation of the dollar, and a fall in the real price of commodities.” (Cardoso and Helwege 1992, 48) In response to these drastic economic changes, a range of policies were implemented: as Thorp (1998, 124) writes, “many opportunities existed for import substitution, land and labor were available to expand and diversify in agriculture, and default on the debt was possible without sanctions or foregone benefits, since no loans and little direct investment were forthcoming anyway.” While the Depression brought an end to the era of export-led growth, in other words, it did not determine the new economic model that would come to dominate the region. Instead, governments implemented

\(^2\) I also use the term ‘inward-looking industrialization’, following many scholars, to highlight the fact that (contrary to the hopes of policymakers) much of the industrialization that ensued during this period continued to depend heavily on imports.
ad-hoc policies, which had in common only the greater state intervention in the economy. (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, 228)

World War II kept world trade from recovering, and thus it exacerbated “nearly a decade of growing disillusionment with the traditional export-led growth model in Latin America.” (ibid, 232) This accelerated the growth of economic nationalism that had emerged in the 1930s. As a result, an ad-hoc policy response gained more credence, bolstered by a set of ideas that delineated a logic behind inward-looking development and industrialization. The “theoretical and institutional support” for inward-looking industrialization came from Raúl Prebisch and the other economists of ECLA, who argued that volatility and long-term declining terms of trade made primary product exports a bad strategy for Latin American countries to follow. (Thorp 1998, 132) Additionally, the growth of the working class and middle class through earlier decades of industrialization meant that whatever policy would be developed had to create jobs to be politically palatable. (Thorp 1998, 128) As a result, beginning during the 1940s, inward-looking industrialization became the dominant mode of economic development in much of the region.

After the Korean War, the recovery of world trade made primary product export a viable economic model once again. Yet some Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay) continued to focus on industrialization and the domestic market. ISI policies were sustained by politicians who drew support from the burgeoning labor sectors that these policies created, even as world market conditions made possible a return to an export-led economic model. In the other 14 countries in the region, where a significant industrial base was not built during the depression and war years, there was a turn back to export-led growth. (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, 268)

In this brief and stylized account, we have all the pieces of a critical juncture framework (See Table One, below). The collapse of export markets and world trade destroyed the export-led growth model. Thus, the Great Depression and World War Two created a context in which inward-looking industrialization could emerge – they acted as permissive conditions, opening a critical juncture in which new macro-
economic institutions would emerge. As Latin American policymakers sought a response to the crisis in primary product exports, they experimented with a range of economic models. Political and economic conditions that pre-dated the critical juncture – the existence of mobilized labor sectors and small business – made inward-looking industrialization a politically viable model to varying degrees in different countries. Combined with influential economic thought coming out of ECLA, then, we have a set of productive conditions which, within the critical juncture, shaped the varied extent to which the inward-looking industrialization model was implemented. When world trade recovered, bringing export-led growth back as a viable option, we see variation being ‘locked in’: where industrialization had developed to a certain extent, it was politically prohibitive for governments to back away from commitments to this model. But where a large industrial base had not been built, the revival of the world economy led to a return to an emphasis on export-led growth, which bore fewer start-up costs and was more politically palatable.

**TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE**

Table One divides the narrative account of the critical juncture of ISI into its conceptual components. I propose that in any critical juncture, we can identify each of these pieces – and argue below that a failure to do so leads to conceptual confusion, which has some serious analytical costs. Before proceeding to those implications, however, I will define and discuss each of these components in turn.

**The Critical Antecedent:**
Slater and Simmons (2009) have argued that critical junctures do not begin with a blank slate. Rather than seeing the critical juncture as a ‘treatment’ that represents the only source of relevant variation across cases, we need to realize that aspects of the antecedents to the critical juncture play a causal role in the outcomes of the critical juncture. These aspects, which they call ‘critical antecedents’, are defined as “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine in a causal
sequence with factors operating during that juncture to produce a divergent outcome.” (2) We see, in the example discussed above, that for the divergence in economic models in the aftermath of the collapse of export-led growth, the strength of labor and the middle class acted as a critical antecedent, shaping the outcome that emerged from the ashes of the earlier development model.

The power of this insight is that it moves beyond the claim that the critical juncture is the only source of variation in historical causation, without falling into infinite regress. I share Slater and Simmons’ view that many of our accounts of historical causation incorporate critical antecedents into their causal logic – and therefore I identify these factors in the discussions of examples below. My only concern with this piece of the critical juncture framework in this paper, then, is to explore the relationship between the critical antecedents and the two types of causal conditions that mark the critical juncture. Thus, in the discussion of the permissive and productive conditions below, I explore the relationship to critical antecedents.

The Permissive Condition:
One component of the critical juncture is the heightened contingency, or increased causal possibility that marks this historical moment.³ As Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 348) write, during a critical juncture “there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest.” It is precisely this reduced importance of structural constraints that opens up space for divergence to emerge. Yet we have little explicit understanding of why some moments in time are characterized by weaker constraints than others. I propose that in any investigation of a critical juncture, we can identify a set of permissive conditions that mark its duration. Permissive conditions can be defined as those

³ Although I use the term ‘contingency’ here, I am agnostic about the relative importance of agency and contingency in the critical juncture – an issue which is discussed in detail in Capoccia and Kelemen’s (2007) exploration of critical junctures. Instead, I share with Slater and Simmons (2009) and Pierson (2004) the view that accounts of critical junctures should emphasize divergence rather than contingency. I borrow the term ‘causal possibility’ from Bennett and Elman (2006).
factors or conditions that change the underlying context to increase the causal power of agency or contingency and thus the prospects for divergence.

Katznelson describes these permissive conditions as moments in which "the moral value of the status quo has been called into question." (2003, 285) This may be one reason for increased contingency. But rather than make a general claim about the origin of permissive conditions, or to develop means of comparing them (in terms, for example, of the range of options they make possible) my goal in this paper is more humble: I claim instead that when we identify a critical juncture, we should delineate it by the presence of some set of permissive conditions that make divergence possible. We can identify a critical juncture as a potential turning point (Abbott 2001, 259), "at which the interlocked networks of relation that preserve stability come unglued and the (normal) perpetual change of social life takes over.” The permissive conditions, in other words, are those which undo the mechanisms of reproduction of the previous critical juncture, and thus create a new context in which contingency or agency can act to create a divergence from the previous stable pattern.4

Crucially, the factors that loosen the constraints of structure are distinct from those that determine the divergence that emerges from the critical juncture which I define below as productive conditions. Permissive conditions may emerge and disappear independent of these productive conditions. The period in which they are in place is a window of opportunity within which divergence is possible. We can identify the time period during which the permissive conditions are present, and point to a beginning and end of the time in which contingency has a greater causal weight. In other words, a critical juncture is temporally bounded by a set of

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4 Colin Elman, in comments on an earlier version, suggested that the undoing of the mechanisms of reproduction may in fact be caused by a set of mechanisms distinct from those that create new space for contingency. I remain persuaded for the moment, however, that Mahoney (2000) provides grounds for the claim that these causal processes are one and the same; that undoing mechanisms of reproduction creates new space for contingency. The permissive conditions, in the language of Bennett and Elman (2006) are the factor that creates causal possibility. Their undoing, as discussed herein, brings that possibility to an end, creating the closure that Bennett and Elman claim also characterizes path dependent accounts.
permissive conditions, which make divergence from previous patterns of institutions possible.\footnote{To be precise, we might be able to distinguish between permissive and productive conditions in many causal accounts. But I wish to restrict the application of the term 'critical juncture' to those in which the productive condition occurs within the temporal bounds of the permissive conditions. Critical junctures are, in other words, windows of opportunity within which fundamental restructuring (large-scale change) with enduring consequences is possible, though it does not necessarily happen.}

Thus the duration of the permissive conditions marks the duration of a critical juncture, resolving an important source of confusion around this concept. Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 350-1) claim that the duration of a critical juncture must be considered relative to the duration of the outcome observed. This view, while persuasive in addressing the extent to which a juncture has criticality, ignores the fact that junctures are characteristics of the historical context and not just of our theoretical frameworks.\footnote{The criticality of a juncture, as Capoccia and Kelemen note, is an artifact of our theoretical framework, but I want to suggest that the presence or absence of a juncture itself is not.} Thus, it sheds light on the criticalness of the juncture while failing to consider the nature of the juncture itself. I propose instead that the duration of the critical juncture is marked by the emergence and disappearance of a set of permissive conditions. These conditions form a window of opportunity for divergence that can be quite lengthy, as the example of ISI discussed above suggests. The conditions that made a shift to inward-looking industrialization possible, without determining it, were shifts in the global economy that resulted from the Great Depression and World War II which destroyed a previous economic model. When world trade recovered in the 1950s, the need for experimentation and policy change came to an end because the old model was viable once again. The fact that some countries shifted to ISI and others did not is not explained by these permissive conditions – to answer that question, we need to turn to a set of productive conditions that explain divergence in the presence of these permissive conditions. But we see here that the permissive or triggering conditions, which put the need for change on the table or make it possible by discrediting a formerly stable model, persist for an easily definable period of time. Indeed, we were able in this example to explicitly identify a moment at which permissive conditions came to an end (the
recovery of world trade in the 1950s) and thus brought the critical juncture to a close.

Note that we can imagine moments of heightened contingency that are not critical junctures: moments in which change is possible, but where change is not reinforced over time. Junctures, in other words, need not be critical. A juncture that is not critical might happen if one period of loosened constraints is followed by another, meaning that the outcomes of the first period are wiped away by a subsequent period of contingency that generates the possibility for renewed variation. A loosening of structural constraints, in other words, is a necessary but insufficient component of a critical juncture. Permissive conditions simply mark a window of opportunity in which divergence may occur, and that divergence may have long-term consequences. Permissive conditions are non-trivial necessary conditions; scope conditions for the causal relationship between the productive condition and the outcome.

As such, one should test for their causal role in the manner appropriate for a necessary but insufficient condition. This entails examining cases in which divergence occurred, and ensuring that there are no such cases in which the permissive conditions were absent. Importantly, cases in which divergence did not happen are irrelevant for assessing the causal claims about the permissive condition. But they are crucial, as we will see below, for testing claims about productive conditions. Using this framework of permissive and productive conditions immediately suggests two causal pathways to negative outcomes (beyond the pathway in which both are absent).

One scenario leading to the absence of change is the absence of change during a critical juncture, where permissive conditions emerge, but productive conditions do not. As Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 352) argue, the absence of change does not mean that a critical juncture does not exist. The second is the absence of the critical juncture that makes change possible: the absence of the permissive conditions that shape the critical juncture. Given that much institutional change happens outside the 'big bang' punctuated equilibrium moments of critical junctures (Mahoney and Thelen 2010), we might make different predictions about
the prospects for incremental changes in these two situations even as they are both negative cases for the dramatic change of a critical juncture. One might imagine in the second 'negative pathway' that the presence of productive conditions might drive incremental change even as the constraints that prevent large-scale divergence are not loosened.

The Productive Conditions:
In the presence of permissive conditions, a set of productive conditions determine the outcome that emerges from the critical juncture. As these factors vary across cases, so too do the outcomes of the critical juncture. In the ISI example discussed above, the reason that inward-looking industrialization was adopted in some countries but not others was the size and political power of the working and middle classes, and the influence of economic ideas from ECLA. We cannot understand the outcome of variation in economic policy without attention to these factors. But these factors do not mark the critical juncture. Instead, they operate within the critical juncture that is bounded by the permissive conditions discussed above. Productive conditions are insufficient to produce divergence in the absence of permissive conditions that loosen the constraints of structure and make divergence possible. But once constraints have been loosened, productive conditions shape the outcomes that emerge and are 'locked in' to varying extent when the window of opportunity of the permissive conditions comes to a close.\(^7\)

Productive conditions can be defined as the factors that are commonly identified as the ‘independent variables’ in critical juncture analyses, or the aspects of a critical juncture that (combined in some cases with critical antecedents) shape the initial outcomes that diverge across cases. We may in some cases see multiple sets of productive conditions within a critical juncture. If the window of opportunity for divergence remains open long enough, we may see multiple sets of divergences – each with its own set of productive causes – only one of which has effects that

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\(^7\) This framing is analogous to the distinction drawn by Falleti and Lynch (2009) between context and causal mechanism: the permissive conditions shape the context, while the productive conditions cause the outcome. I am agnostic, however, about the utility of specifying causal mechanisms that are portable across permissive contexts.
endure after the critical juncture closes. This implies that we must identify the outcome of interest and trace backward to identify the factors that produced it during the critical juncture.

Importantly, since the relationship between productive condition and outcome is bound by the scope conditions set by the permissive condition, the relationship should only be tested in cases where the scope condition is present. For example, the account of ISI developed above claims that ECLA’s economic ideas led to ISI only where world trade collapsed. To show that ISI did not emerge, despite the salience of economic nationalist ideas, where world trade remained stable, does not undercut the claim that ECLA’s ideas were the productive condition underlying its rise in a certain context.

Whereas permissive conditions take the form of necessary but insufficient causes, productive conditions may take various causal forms. Most commonly, they will also be necessary but insufficient causes, which when combined with the permissive conditions are jointly sufficient for the divergence. But we might imagine a case in which a set of substitutable productive conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient. Precision in delineating the causal logic of the critical juncture is crucial in designing the test of the productive condition, which may take different forms.

CRITICAL JUNCTURES AND TYPES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The distinction between permissive and productive conditions suggests that all historical moments can be divided into four types, as seen in Table Two (below). The first type of historical context is described in the upper left hand cell, labelled ‘normal politics’. Here, neither the permissive conditions that mark the bounds of a critical juncture, nor the productive conditions that set off long-term trajectories are present. Dramatic change under these conditions – or indeed any change whatsoever – is not predicted by our theory. The lower left hand cell, in which productive conditions are present, but the permissive conditions that loosen

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8 Thanks to Jim Mahoney for helping me clarify my views here.
constraints are not, will also not be expected to see the dramatic change that marks critical junctures. Instead, we may expect that these moments are characterized by incremental change, as the conditions that produce divergence may still have effects even when the constraints on major change are in place.

**INSERT TABLE TWO HERE**

Beyond these two types, we have two other types of time in the right hand column, in which permissive conditions are present. The upper right hand cell, where permissive conditions are present but productive are absent, can be seen as crisis without change or ‘missed opportunity.’ Although the configuration of causes here is analytically distinct from the left hand column, the outcome [absence of divergence] is the same. Yet to test the importance of permissive and productive conditions separately, we must identify cases that fall into each of these three cells. The fourth cell, where both permissive and productive conditions are present, is our category of critical juncture.

The relative frequency of each cell – and thus the balance of stability, incremental change, and punctuated change – is determined by the rareness of the permissive and productive conditions. If the permissive condition is present in a large percentage of historical moments, it becomes a more trivial necessary condition. Thus, for critical junctures to be a truly meaningful categorization of causal possibility, the permissive condition must be rare, and the occurrence of moments in the right column must be rare compared to the left. If we reserve the concept of the critical juncture for rare moments, we are also not likely to see many ‘missed opportunities’ in which we find ourselves in the upper right-hand cell. Instead, the more common contexts will be those on the left: those in which the permissive conditions are absent. This is an intuitively satisfying conclusion, since it suggests, as Mahoney and Thelen (2010) have argued, that the incremental change of the lower left-hand cell is the most common type of institutional change.

We might also compare the relative frequency of the top and bottom rows in the table, which is determined by the likelihood of finding the productive condition
present in any given moment. If the productive condition takes the form of a non-trivial necessary condition, it would be present in a small proportion of cases – and thus we would expect that the most common type of institutional change is in fact represented in the top left-hand cell: no change. If, however, the productive condition takes a different causal form (whether a sufficient condition or a complex interaction of multiple productive conditions), we cannot draw any conclusions about the expected frequency moving vertically in this table.

**Mechanisms of Reproduction:**
Much has been written about mechanisms of reproduction, and this paper is not the place for further exploration. Suffice it to say that what makes a juncture critical is that the outcomes generated during one historical period persist over time. The sources of this persistence are thus a component of a complete critical juncture framework. But since this paper focuses on the causal structure of the juncture itself, and not of the production of its legacies, heritage, or aftermath, I do not address the issues of the mechanisms of reproduction herein. Instead, I turn to a series of examples that highlight the presence of both permissive and productive conditions in the critical juncture, using these to raise some implications of this more precise specification of the critical juncture framework.

**Some Examples:**
**CRITICAL JUNCTURES AS CONDITIONAL CAUSATION**
Collier and Collier’s *Shaping the Political Arena* (1991) shows that the manner of labor incorporation had long-term political consequences in Latin America. We can identify the mode of labor incorporation as the productive condition; and the permissive condition as the crisis of labor mobilization that placed the ‘social question’ in the center of political contention. Collier and Collier only consider the effects of variation in the productive condition: all eight of the cases in their work saw a critical juncture take place. Their interest is in the ways in which different ‘values’ of the productive condition (in interaction with the critical antecedent of elite power in the countryside, as shown by Slater and Simmons) shape divergent
regime outcomes over subsequent decades. But we might imagine a condition in which the critical juncture did not take place – where the oligarchic control of politics was not threatened by the rise of labor – and indeed this was the case in some the Latin American countries not explored by Collier and Collier. In these cases, the permissive or triggering condition of the disruption of the old political order did not take place, and the critical juncture never emerged.

A complete theory of labor incorporation and regime outcomes in Latin America would have to look at cases where labor incorporation was not triggered or not possible: where there was no critical juncture. But this, of course, is a different question from the one that Collier and Collier are asking: the research design needed to study the origins of regime outcomes is distinct from that needed to examine the political effects of labor incorporation. By identifying the permissive condition, however, we make explicit the boundedness of our claims about the relationship between the productive condition and the outcome of interest. Since the permissive condition of the rise of labor bounds the theory of regime dynamics that Collier and Collier develop, it acts as a scope condition on the relationship between the mode of labor incorporation and regime outcomes.

The failure to specify this bound becomes problematic when claims that the productive condition causes variation in the outcome are made without attention to the conditional nature of causation in the critical juncture framework. We should not expect, from Collier and Collier’s theory, that the mode of labor incorporation will affect political outcomes in the long term where politics has not re-aligned around the social question in advance of this ‘moment.’ The explicit specification of permissive conditions is valuable precisely because it provides an explicit bound on the domain of cases to which the link between productive condition and outcome can be expected to apply.9

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9 Thus this provides an answer to the concern raised by Geddes (2003, 139-42) about the difficulties of identifying a strategy for testing critical juncture arguments.
CONTEXT AND CHOICE

Michael Barnett’s *Confronting the Costs of War* (1992) explores the effects of war on state power in Israel and Egypt. National security challenges – war or the threat of war – induce governments in both countries to seek to increase their extractive and mobilizational capacity. Barnett claims that governments choose between accommodating, restructuring, and international outreach in their mobilizational efforts, and have varying degrees of success. Governments always adopt an accommodating strategy first, seeking to mobilize resources through alliances with societal actors. When this avenue of mobilization is exhausted, Barnett predicts, governments will turn to restructuring or international strategies – and this choice is explained by a ‘decision context’ determined by the state’s relationship to the capitalist class, the pre-existing level of state power, the domestic economic structure, and the extent of state legitimacy.

In this account we can identify all the elements of a critical juncture framework. What makes Barnett’s account particularly useful is that he identifies both permissive and causal conditions, and develops a theory that explicitly incorporates both elements. Whereas many other accounts of the relationship between war and state-building directly connect trigger to outcome, Barnett argues that “crisis politics creates the conditions for institutional change and innovation.” (257) In other words, war creates the conditions for state building, but does not automatically result in state building. War, then, is a permissive condition for the growth of state power.10

If the onset of war or a national security threat is a permissive condition in Barnett’s account, the outcome of an increase or decrease in state power is shaped by the strategy chosen by the government in response to the threat. These strategies, then, are the productive condition. When adopted in the context of the permissive condition (during the critical juncture), they produce variation in the outcome of interest: whereas accommodating and international strategies “can affect state power, a restructuring strategy most profoundly contains the seeds of its

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10 Note that Ertman (1997) conceptualizes the relationship between war and bureaucratic development in a similar fashion.
transformation.” (40) It is the strategy chosen in response to an external threat, not the threat itself, that shapes the state power outcomes caused by war. This theoretical insight points the way to sharper analyses of the relationship between war and the state by pointing our attention to variation in response to international threat as our focus of interest. State power may grow, and state-society relations may be altered, during the critical juncture of war. But whereas Tilly’s famous ‘states made war and war made states’ only identified a relationship, Barnett develops a set of predictions about when this relationship will and will not hold. This set of predictions depends on the causal mechanism he has elaborated (strategy of resource mobilization), which can only be identified by distinguishing between permissive and productive conditions, and seeing the international threat of war as the former rather than the latter.11

BEYOND ‘INDEPENDENT VARIABLES’ IN CRITICAL JUNCTURES
Unlike Barnett, McAdam’s Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 (1999[1982]) fails to distinguish explicitly between permissive and productive conditions in making his critical juncture argument. Yet it may be useful to do so, because it allows the reader to think about the relationships between his causal conditions rather than lumping them all together as ‘independent variables.’ (Slater and Simmons 2009, Figure 2) As Slater and Simmons note, McAdam’s account begins with a detailed analysis of a critical antecedent: the decline of ‘King Cotton’ that "served to undermine the politico-economic conditions on which the racial status quo had been based.” (73) The decline of cotton weakened the north-south elite alliance that kept race off the national political agenda, and reduced the risks for protest and organization. Rural-urban migration within the south provided a context within which organization could take place, and migration of blacks out of the south increased the power of the black vote.

As a result of all these changes, McAdam writes, “a series of processes in the period from 1931 to 1954 were identified as facilitating the rise of the black vote.

11 Tilly (1992) makes a similar argument, highlighting the strategies taken in response to international threats as crucial in determining the outcomes of state strength.
movement in the 1950s by shaping not only the opportunities for successful collective action but the organizational capacity to exploit those opportunities.” In this quote, we see the entire critical juncture framework: the outcome of interest is the black movement that emerged after 1956; the critical antecedent is a set of structural processes that made vulnerable the old racial order; and the permissive and productive conditions are the opportunity for collective action and the organizational capacity to exploit it.

In McAdam’s framework, the conditions that make the black insurgency possible – the permissive conditions – are the changes in the political opportunity structure: the “expanding opportunities for political action” afforded by “a dramatic shift in the balance of forces in American race relations.” (86) Specifically, McAdam refers to the fact that the federal government, as a result of the changed context (the critical antecedent) “could now be pressured to adopt increasingly favorable positions on racial issues.” (3) This vulnerability of the political establishment made the mobilization of the civil rights movement possible.

But within the context of this loosening of structural constraints of federal government support for the racial order, McAdam argues that a distinct set of factors were crucial in explaining the emergence of the civil rights movement. The ‘organizational base’ of the civil rights movement grew during the years 1930-54, as churches, colleges, and the NAACP bloomed in the context of the declining cotton economy. The mobilization of these organizations interacted in a mutually reinforcing fashion with the growth of hope and a sense of emergent efficacy about the prospects of collective action for producing change. These productive conditions allowed blacks to seize upon the political opportunities afforded by the changing political context to set off the civil rights movement.

Distinguishing between permissive and productive conditions, rather than considering all of them as independent variables, is crucial. It allows the consumer of McAdam’s account to identify the moment at which the critical juncture for mobilization opened – and to do so independent of mobilization itself. In this way, we can understand why the Brown v. Board Supreme Court decision of 1954 marked the opening of the window of opportunity for the civil rights movement: it
represented a “watershed moment” (3) in the loosening of the structural constraints on black mobilization by committing governments to dismantle segregated education. This decision, which was the culmination of a series of Supreme Court cases that represented a “realignment of political forces favorable to blacks” (112), made the civil rights movement possible. As McAdam notes at the end of his book, the rise of a conservative 'backlash' would shift the political opportunity structure once again in the late 1960s, bringing the window of opportunity for mobilization to a close. (191ff)

Within the opportunity structure that civil rights organizers faced, the extent of mobilization was shaped by organization and 'cognitive liberation.' These productive conditions varied over time (and over space and social group) within the window of opportunity, underlying variation in the extent of mobilization. The Montgomery bus boycotts of 1955-6 – the trigger that, within a permissive context, set off an insurgency – and the rise and fall of the mobilization that followed can be explained by these factors. And McAdam explains how fraying organizations and the loss of hope in nonviolent change weakened the civil rights movement by the mid 1960s. According to McAdam’s framework, the civil rights movement could have emerged any time after 1954, and could have lasted until 1968 – this was the window of opportunity for mobilization. That it lasted from the Montgomery bus boycotts to about 1966 was the result of the rise and decay of the productive conditions. Distinguishing between permissive and productive conditions allows us to identify a ‘possibility space’ within which the civil rights movement could have happened, independent of the factors that caused it to happen when it did: to develop a full theory of the causes of the movement.

The same point can be made in reference to Deborah Yashar’s (1997) *Demanding Democracy*, which examines the divergent regime outcomes in Costa Rica and Guatemala. Her analytical framework focuses on a critical juncture of the reforms of the (long decade of the) 1940s, and the subsequent counter-reforms. Within this “reform context” (Mahoney 2001, 26), multiclass coalitions emerged that sought, in both cases, to dismantle elite control of politics. The strategies they chose, and the
alliances they made, shaped the new regime outcomes, which came to endure over time because of the establishment of control the countryside. The language used here suggests the presence of permissive and productive conditions.

Yashar herself uses the language of a "window of opportunity" (70) to refer to the elite divisions that marked the possibility for reformers to push into the political arena. Here she refers to elite divisions, in concert with “rising popular and middle-class organizing”, making the emergence of multiclass coalitions in general possible and thus providing a context in which political institutions are destabilized. She argues, in other words, that the overlapping of elite splits and popular mobilization represents a permissive condition for realignment, while the nature of the coalitions that emerge (including the strategies they chose, alliances they made, and balance of power within them) act as productive conditions, in that they set off sequences that produced the regime outcomes. The scope of reforms set off countermobilization on the part of elites – but the fact that elites were unified in Guatemala and split in Costa Rica shaped the different decision-making institutions that emerged within these coalitions, establishing authoritarian rule in Guatemala and democracy in Costa Rica.12

Why do these outcomes get locked in? They are locked in, Yashar argues, because the counter-reformist regimes were able to establish control of the countryside in both cases. Rural control kept the “country’s most disruptive social sectors: agrarian elites and the rural poor” (214) from disrupting politics, by co-opting the former and establishing the ability to control the latter. The establishment of rural control, then, marks the end of the window of opportunity for regime change by ‘locking in’ regime outcomes.

It is thus a misnomer to refer to elite divisions, mass mobilization, and reformist coalitions as analytically equivalent independent variables within Yashar's critical juncture – or to refer to regime type as her only dependent variable. Instead, we should see the first two as permissive conditions, because they shape a political

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12 Additionally, the relative depth of civil society – shaped by another critical antecedent of the Liberal Reform era – influenced the decisionmaking procedures that emerged within the counter-reform coalitions.
arena within which political outcomes are re-defined through coalitional politics. The re-establishment of state control over the countryside brings an end to these elite divisions (by committing agrarian elites to the regime in power) and mass mobilization (by co-opting or repressing mobilization), and thus brings the window of opportunity for regime re-organization to a close. Within those permissive conditions, a ‘reformist’ or ‘counter-reformist’ context, marked by contingency, coalitional fluidity, and rapid change, produced a series of short-lived political regimes, each of which was shaped by its predecessor and by the critical antecedents of the Liberal era. It was only when one of these regimes was able to establish rural control that the conditions that permitted regime fluidity came to a close. This is Yashar’s broader point: regime stability – whether authoritarian or democratic – depends on the ability of the regime in power to prevent elite splits and mass mobilization, and the most dangerous form these takes, particularly in the developing world, are rural.

This interpretation of Yashar highlights her broader claims about the roots of regime stability and fluidity: regimes are stable so long as they don’t face a conjuncture of concurrent elite divisions and mass mobilization.\(^{13}\) In the Liberal era, they faced the former but not the latter. During the 1940s, they faced both, creating a window of opportunity for regime fluidity. Thereafter, the establishment of rural control re-solidified regimes in both Costa Rica and Guatemala, locking in outcomes that persisted for subsequent decades. This account of the structure of historical causation in Yashar’s book highlights that, beyond democracy and authoritarianism, her account also explains the dynamics of regime stability and fluidity. The presence and absence of the permissive conditions shape regime stability and fluidity, while the productive conditions shape the nature of the regime itself.\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\) This account echoes Elisabeth Jean Wood’s (2000) argument about the origins of democracy in El Salvador: authoritarian rule was destabilized for the first time in the 1980s only because that was the first moment at which the regime faced both mass mobilization and elite division.

\(^{14}\) In this way, I depart slightly from Slater and Simmons’ comparison of Mahoney and Yashar, which suggests that the accounts fit together quite closely. I agree that the two accounts share an emphasis on state building and the commercialization of agriculture in the Liberal era. But my reading suggests that they coincide in their accounts of the origins of regime stability: for Mahoney, the Liberal Reforms create the stable regime outcomes that he studies by establishing this control. His discussion of the Liberal era as “a foundational period” cites the construction of state organizational
CRITICAL JUNCTURES WITHOUT PERMISSIVE CONDITIONS?

A reading of Hendrik Spruyt’s *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (1994) suggests that not all critical junctures may take the form proposed in this paper. Spruyt finds that the expansion of trade caused the decline of the old feudal order, and that variation in the nature of trade across the map of Europe shaped the political arrangements that emerged after the wane of feudalism. We have a sense, then, that the expansion of trade acts as both the permissive and productive condition here. If this is correct, then the structure of Spruyt’s argument challenges my claim that critical junctures are composed of temporally nested but analytically distinct permissive and productive conditions.

It is clear that Spruyt proposes a critical juncture model to explain why the sovereign territorial state emerged as the outcome of European political development. He writes that “changes in political organization seem to be preceded by broad shifts in constraints and opportunities imposed on social actors by the external milieu.” (25) First, Spruyt argues that the decline of the feudal order created conditions in which the emergence of new political forms was possible. The “expansion of trade was the critical external change that set this process in motion during the High Middle Ages.” (25) This growth of agricultural production and trade led to monetarization of the economy, specialization and the division of labor, and the growth of towns. In so doing, it brought onto the political stage the towns and their residents, the burghers, who had new sources of revenue and power. Thus, the social and economic changes of the High Middle Ages created a context in which new social actors sought to change existing institutions. Trade expansion, at first, appears to act as a permissive condition for the emergence of new political forms.

capacity, the establishment of “more modern state apparatuses”, and the incorporation of the rural sector into the world market through export agriculture as the crucial transformations that were brought about. (31) Not coincidentally, these conditions closely match those that Yashar cites as crucial for the emergence of regime stability. (Yashar 1997, 215) But Mahoney does not make these conditions an explicit subject of identification because he is more interested in long-term trajectories than in the relative salience of stability and fluidity within them – and this is a crucial difference between their accounts of regime dynamics in Costa Rica and Guatemala.
The creation of new political forms was possible when the old hierarchies of power had been undermined by social and economic change.

But Spruyt proceeds to argue that a variety of new types of political institutions were created. Institutional variation was shaped by the character and level of trade: where trade was insignificant and urbanization low, a preference of the part of merchants for central organization to improve economic conditions led to the formation of a territorial state as in France. Where (as among German towns) trade was high in volume but low in added value, towns preferred a central actor to reduce transaction costs, and thus developed the Hansa league. Finally, where trade had a high value added and moderate volume, and urbanization was high, towns did not need a strong central actor, and competed rather than colluding in the establishment of political power. This set of conditions led to the outcome of city-states, as in Italy.15

The striking thing about Spruyt’s account, unlike the critical juncture frameworks dissected above, is that he does not distinguish between permissive and productive conditions: the rise of trade created new political actors who both undermined feudalism and established new political orders in its wake, and the nature of trade shaped the coalitions and institutions that they formed. This suggests that Spruyt’s analysis reveals a model of critical juncture that is not marked by the ‘loosening of structural constraints’ distinct from the determinant of variation. Indeed, he calls the rise of trade the “generative cause” (28) that both created new social actors and differentially endowed them with power and preferences.16 This raises the possibility that the permissive/productive framework developed in this paper only describes one sub-category of critical junctures.

15 Unlike the standard critical juncture argument, which seeks to explain the historical origins of contemporary variation, Spruyt’s analysis shows why that initial variation did not persist. The institutional alternatives to the sovereign state were eliminated, he argues, by a set of internal and external selection pressures. This account of selection distinguishes Spruyt from standard critical juncture analyses. I do not address that portion of his explanation – I focus instead on the set of factors that made possible and motivated the emergence of variation in political form in the aftermath of feudalism.

16 A second possibility is that the permissive and productive conditions both result from the rise of trade, but via analytically distinct causal pathways. A third alternative, of course, is that there is a missing permissive condition in his discussion. If this were the case, we might look for (1) something
CRITICAL ANTECEDENTS AND CRITICAL JUNCTURES:
Whereas Slater and Simmons (2009, 5) simply state that “a critical antecedent produces the outcome of interest in combination with the independent variable(s) operative at the critical juncture”, It may be useful to distinguish several sub-types of this relationship. One can imagine critical antecedents that interact with permissive conditions to affect the nature of the loosening of structural constraints. By contrast, some works argue that the critical antecedent affects the productive condition. In this framework, the emergence of permissive conditions acts as an exogenous shock. Barnett makes an argument of this type, conceptualizing war – the permissive condition – as an exogenous shock. The response of the state to that shock is shaped by what Barnett calls the ‘decision context’ that it confronts: a context shaped by pre-war state-society relations. The critical antecedent shapes the productive condition, affecting the outcome – the change in state power – that emerges from the pressures created by the permissive condition of international threat.

It is interesting to note that in McAdam’s account, the critical antecedent affects both the permissive and productive conditions. The decline of King Cotton both facilitated the loosening of structural constraints for black mobilization, and underlay the increasing momentum of organization. For Barnett, state-society relations don’t make war more likely, they just shape the strategy chosen by state leaders once the exogenous shock of war occurs. By contrast, for McAdam, the changing opportunity structure is not shaped by an exogenous shock. This suggests that Barnett and McAdam develop different models of critical junctures – and that we may need to disaggregate the concept of the critical juncture into subtypes depending on the logical relationships between the causal conditions within them.  

other than the rise of trade (such as war, for example) that undermined feudalism, or (2) an explanation besides coalition building and political struggle for the temporal gap between the decline of feudalism and the rise of new institutional orders. To the extent that Spruyt effectively addresses both of these issues, we must accept that trade shapes both permissive and productive conditions. 17 I’d like to find an example where the critical antecedent shapes the nature of the permissive condition, but the productive conditions are independent of both – it seems like this is logically possible, but I can’t find an example of this logical structure for a critical juncture.
Where the critical antecedent shapes only the productive condition, we can conceive of a window of opportunity that is shaped by factors exogenous to the causal process that produces the outcome. However, when the opening and closing of this period of contingency is not exogenous to the outcome that emerges – where permissive and productive conditions are not independent of one another – the structure of causation gets more complex – as suggested above in the discussion of Spruyt as well.

**Concluding with some thoughts about implications:**
The examples discussed above highlight several implications of the critical juncture framework I propose. To close the paper, I highlight each of these in turn. First, by identifying permissive conditions and ‘windows of opportunity’, scholars can highlight the scope conditions that bound the claims about causation within the critical juncture. Critical junctures are time periods within which the bounds of structure are loosened – it is only within these moments that productive conditions act to produce outcomes of interest. We should not expect these causal relationships to hold in the absence of the permissive context. Thus, to test these causal claims, we must begin by clearly identifying permissive conditions and showing their presence independent of the productive conditions and outcomes. Only where the permissive conditions can be shown to exist – where a critical juncture is open – should we expect that the productive conditions are linked to the outcome.

Case selection to test a critical juncture argument of this type should proceed in two stages. First, scholars should test for the necessity of the permissive conditions by selecting cases where the outcome of interest is present and examining the historical record for evidence that the permissive conditions were present when the process that produced the outcome began. Second, scholars

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18 Here for the purposes of fluency of prose I fold critical antecedents into the ‘causal process that produces the outcome.’
should test for the sufficiency or necessity of the productive conditions by selecting cases within this sample as is fitting.\textsuperscript{19}

This insight also sheds light on a component often missing in even the best critical juncture analyses: the specification of the end of a critical juncture. Even those works that identify the permissive conditions that set off a critical juncture often fail to specify what brings that juncture to a close – and we should note that what brings a juncture to a close may occur before, during, or after the operation of productive conditions.\textsuperscript{20} It may be that the reverse of its opening has that effect – for example, the end of a war may bring an end to the possibility that states can radically transform their relationship with social actors. Alternatively, it may be that the productive conditions themselves bring an end to an era of heightened contingency by producing a new stable institutional outcome. Third, a completely exogenous set of conditions – independent from both the initial permissive conditions, and the productive conditions – may have this effect. In McAdam (1999), for example, the window of opportunity for civil rights mobilization came to an end because of the rise of 'law and order' politics and a conservative backlash that shifted the political opportunity structure in ways inimical to black mobilization.

The logical framework of permissive and productive conditions implies that there are two logically distinct pathways that produce negative cases: those in which the permissive conditions never emerged, and those in which the permissive conditions emerged, but the productive conditions did not. Recognition that either of these pathways may explain the absence of an outcome in a particular case has implications for the testing of explanations. There are significant payoffs to identifying cases that follow both negative pathways, yet most research fails to do so. Instead, much critical juncture research bounds the set of cases being studied by

\textsuperscript{19} The more general point to be taken from this discussion is that scholars should explicitly state the logic of causation of the critical juncture – in terms of necessity and sufficiency – before proceeding to case selection. Failure to do this may be a fundamental flaw in research design.

\textsuperscript{20} I have argued elsewhere that the rise of the capital/labor cleavage in Latin America brought an end to concerted efforts by state leaders to increase the spatial reach of the state, independent of the extent to which those efforts had succeeded. This is a case in which the window of opportunity closed too soon for state building efforts to succeed in some cases, while in others it had already advanced to a greater extent.
the presence of the productive condition, failing to test whether the permissive condition is necessary for the outcome under investigation. This, of course, is fine so long as the research question is about the effect of the productive condition on the outcome. However, once we seek a general explanation of the presence or absence of the outcome, we must look beyond the productive condition to explain why critical junctures open in some cases but not others. Thus, there are good reasons to explore cases in which critical junctures do not emerge: if we find that our outcome of interest does exist, we must revise our theory accordingly.

Finally, it is worth considering the utility of exploring various analytical subtypes of critical junctures. This paper has shown subtle differences in the causal relationship between the components of the critical juncture framework. These relationships between critical antecedents, permissive conditions, and causal conditions can be stated in terms of necessity, sufficiency, or independence – and all have implications for theoretical precision, and thus for research design. Yet to date, scholars have been satisfied to label critical junctures simply as a time period without inquiring into what makes that time period distinct from those that precede and follow it. This paper has tried to correct that omission by proposing one model of what a critical juncture is, showing that it fits many classic accounts that use the conceptual framing, while acknowledging that not all critical junctures take this form.

Much scholarship in the historical-institutional paradigm has focused on persistence – and recent work has begun to explore the relative weight of persistence and change over time. Empirical examples of this work often take the form of critical juncture arguments – yet scholars focus much more on the criticality of those junctures than on the junctures that turn out to be so critical. Echoing Slater and Simmons’ (2009) call to pay more attention in our theorizing to the periods before the critical juncture, this paper proposes a first attempt to theorize explicitly what unfolds within a critical juncture. It may be that not all critical junctures are marked by distinct permissive and causal conditions, but I have argued that most do take this form. If this is the case, scholars must begin to explicitly delineate these
conditions, and to design their research to explore both why critical junctures open and close, and the (conditional) nature of causation during these moments of loosened stricture.
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### Table One: Inward-Looking Industrialization as a Critical Juncture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Antecedent</th>
<th>Strength of middle class and labor as of 1929</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permissive Condition</td>
<td>Collapse of world trade and economic challenges of Great Depression and World War II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive Condition</td>
<td>Economic ideas of ECLA and more general rise of economic nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Inward-looking industrialization implemented to varying degrees in Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of Critical Juncture</td>
<td>Recovery of world trade by 1950, and especially after the Korean War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms of Reproduction</td>
<td>New political coalitions between bureaucrats, domestic elites, and organized labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Crises of populist rule and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell 1973)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table Two: Permissive and Productive Conditions and Outcomes

| Productive Conditions | Permissive Conditions |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
|                       | Absent                | Present              |
| Absent                | Status Quo            | Crisis without change or missed opportunity |
| Present               | Incremental change    | Critical juncture    |